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Striving for Political Influence 
Modern societies’ heterogeneity of preferences seems to increase over time. Many of 
these preferences are affected by political decisions in a more or less direct way. Strictly 
speaking, every law has an impact on some actors’ preferences. If actors want to actively 
pursue their preferences, they need to find ways to affect political decisions. The broad term 
for all these ways is political influence. The research question of this dissertation therefore is: 
how do actors get access to political influence? 
Political influence is the general ability to change political outcome. Speaking 
counterfactually, political outcomes would have been different if some actor had not used his 
or her political influence. Since political influence is a rather abstract concept, it is very useful 
to understand it as a limited resource that some actors have access to and others have not. If 
there is one group of actors that is able to restrict access to political influence or to even 
monopolize this resource, this group is called a political elite. Following a recent summary of 
elite studies in sociology (Khan 2012), political elites can be understood as a group of actors 
with a disproportionate control over political capital. An existing political elite also implies a 
strong inequality concerning access to political influence within a society. 
There are two important ways for political elites to protect their privileged access to 
political influence. First, political elites can be organized. Interest groups and political parties 
are well-known examples. Second, political elites can be institutionalized. Here, parliaments 
and other kinds of political offices serve as prototypical instances. Regardless of the specific 
configuration of the elite’s structure, political elites are a very frequent phenomenon in 
societies. Political elites may be smaller or larger and more or less permeable, but it seems to 
be a general rule that political hierarchies emerge wherever larger groups of people meet. By 
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definition, most actors will stay outside the elite. Nevertheless, excluded actors also have an 
interest in realizing their preferences as well as elite actors. The more precise research 
question of this dissertation therefore is: how are actors able to pursue their political interests 
if there is a political elite that controls the access to political influence? 
I approached this research question by applying an analytical frame that is based upon 
a social network perspective. By doing so, I propose a distinction between three possible 
social structures that have the potential to enable actors to get access to the elite. In the next 
step, I outline my research strategy and describe the three papers that constitute this 
dissertation. I conclude this framing chapter with a summary of the results and suggestions for 
further research in this direction. 
Analytical Framework 
I approached my research question from a social network perspective. More precisely, 
I developed theoretical arguments that are based on the assumption that the social structure – 
the sum of individual actors and the connections between them – plays a significant role in 
understanding the access to political influence. Starting with this perspective, figure 1 
illustrates the analytical frame of my research question. The left half of figure 1 shows the 
basic setting. There is a (latent) group of actors with shared preferences. However, there is a 
political elite that these actors cannot circumvent. The elite serves as a gatekeeper. The right 
half of Figure 1 pictures the three theoretical possibilities for actors to get access to the 
political elite: ties, intersection and careers. Each of these avenues has its own logic and the 
underlying mechanisms deserve a close examination. Yet, the specific effect of each 
mechanism depends on the empirical question at hand. Therefore, I restrict the description to 
the basic ideas and refer to the single papers for the extensive arguments and further details. 
 8 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Illustation of the analytical frame of my research question. There is a (latent) group of actors 
with shared preferences that needs access to the elite in order to get access to political influence. The three 
possible ways to get this access are ties, intersection and careers. 
 
In this framework, ties between the elite and other actors constitute bridges. As the 
term suggests, bridges cross cleavages but the groups stay separated. A well-known advantage 
of ties between groups is the additional access to information, which can then be used to adapt 
strategies or to identify new courses of action. Probably the most famous works based on this 
idea, applied it to economic advantages that actors can get out of ties (Burt 1995; Granovetter 
1973). More recent contributions attempt to transfer these ideas to social movements by 
generalizing individual advantages to the group level (Diani 1997, 2003). Despite different 
research questions, it is widely accepted that ties between two groups lead to measurable 
advantages for at least one and very often both sides. 
1. Ties 
2. Intersection 
3. Career 
? 
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In contrast, if it is possible for actors to become a member of the elite without losing 
their membership in the non-elite group, intersection can appear. Intersection emerges if 
groups start to overlap because some actors are brokers between them. There are many 
examples in the literature of how brokers make profit, especially if they are able to maintain 
their position (Padgett and Ansell 1993). There are also conceptualizations about different 
types of brokers (Gould and Fernandez 1989). The literature on brokerage is extensive, 
therefore I have to refer to a recent review article for further details (Stovel and Shaw 2012). 
The last possible social structure to get access to political influence is constituted by 
careers. Here, the focus lies on transitions from an outsider to a full member of the elite. The 
memberships do not remain the same and they do not add up. They change completely. In the 
context of political influence, the most important kind of career is a political career. 
Considerable parts of the literatur on this issue are concerned with individuals’ ambitions and 
decisions (e.g., Fox and Lawless 2005; Recchi 1999). In contrast, I want to emphasize that 
careers create the potential for non-elites’ preferences to get access to political influence. 
Research Strategy 
The aim of this dissertation’s research strategy is the identification of the three 
possible social structures of actors’ access to political influence and the related mechanisms. 
Therefore, the focus lies on internal validity and less on a direct generalizability of the results. 
In order to achieve this goal, two requirements are essential. First, there has to be enough 
variation between observations both on the dependent and on all independent variables. I 
accomplished this requirement by analyzing long periods of time and by considering a large 
number of observations in each case. By analyzing long periods of time, I was able to separate 
the general mechanisms from more specific, and probably fast-paced, dynamics. The large 
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number of observations enabled me to apply quantitative methods of analysis, which are 
better suited to detect general patterns than qualitative approaches. Qualitative examples are 
provided in some cases to illustrate theoretical arguments or key findings but they are not 
meant as additional evidence in a strict sense. Second, the context needs to be stable enough 
to exclude potential bias by differences on the macro level. In order to fulfill this requirement, 
I chose two cases within one political environment and one case with very similar and 
therefore comparable political systems. 
This research strategy requires a specific kind of cases. That is, the cases are chosen in 
order to evaluate whether the analytical frame has explanatory potential. If this proves to be 
true, these cases can be used as starting points for further research. Subsequent investigations 
can then clarify under which circumstances given mechanisms have more or less impact on 
political outcomes. I return to more specific suggestions on this issue at the end of this chapter 
as well as in the conclusions of each paper. 
More specifically, each paper of this dissertation focuses on one of the social 
structures and the underlying mechanisms. Separating these mechanisms is an analytical 
approach to make the empirical tests as straightforward as possible. It is important to keep in 
mind that social structures are highly complex and fluid. For instance, cases with intersection 
can also include careers or bridges or both. However, each case in this dissertation was 
chosen in a way that allowed clear conclusions on the effect of one specific mechanism 
without neglecting other possible influences. 
Before I turn to a more detailed discussion of the single papers, some words on the 
basic idea of each paper. The first empirical case focuses on ties between the slave traders and 
the political elite in 18th century Bristol, England. By applying network simulation techniques, 
Henning Hillmann and I looked at variations in network connectivity to estimate how 
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important these ties were for the slave traders’ attempt to protect their business from an 
abolitionists campaign. The second paper is about the German anti-nuclear movement and its 
intersection with members of the Green party that were also members of the parliamentarian 
elite. The amounts of intersection vary between regions, which enabled me to estimate the 
effect of more or less intersection on the movement’s success. The third empirical analysis 
focuses on the political careers of Norwegian candidates for the national parliament between 
1945 and 2010. Here, variation stems from the difference between successful and 
unsuccessful candidates. I used these differences to estimate the influencing factors for the 
probability of a successful career. The following description of the three papers is limited to 
the general argument, the basic analysis and the key findings. Refer to the original papers for 
more details.  
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I. A Closed Elite? – Bristol’s Society of Merchant 
Venturers and the Abolition of Slave Trading 
This paper focuses on the first kind of social structure that might enable actors to get 
access to the political elite: ties. In this scenario, a clear distinction between members of the 
elite and non-elite actors remains, so there is no room for parallel memberships in both 
groups. To ensure that this setting is empirically valid, we focused on a case with an 
organized elite. Organizations have clear boundaries. Thus, the identification of membership 
is straightforward. The specific elite organization also classifies as the political elite due to its 
strong connection to the political system. The actors outside the elite share a common 
economic interest, which strongly depends on political decisions: slave trade. 
Slave trade was one of the most established and profitable trades in England during 
the 18th century. Although it was a risky endeavor, it was also an opportunity for less 
established merchants to make enough profit to launch a long-term career. There are some 
discussions in the literature about the precise profit rates of the slave trade but the overall 
profitability is rarely contested. Therefore, slave trade was an important part of the English 
trade system for a very long period of time. Consequently, the slave traders had a common 
interest in protecting this trade. The need for protection became significant when, in 1787, the 
founding of the Society for Effecting the Abolition of the Slave Trade marked the beginning of 
the final attack on slave trade. In 1807, the House of Commons officially banned slave trade 
and the slave traders had lost their struggle. In this paper, we analyzed the connections 
between the slave traders and the political elite to understand how these ties influenced the 
slave traders’ lack of success. A focus on ties implies knowledge of the actual connections 
between actors on the micro level. Therefore, we chose to use Bristol as an example. Not only 
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was Bristol one of the three most important slave trading ports, there is also high-quality data 
available for the analysis. 
In the paper, we argue that local elite organizations can serve two purposes. On the 
one hand, they can provide an organizational platform for different forms of mobilization. For 
instance, they can support political struggles by activating their contacts to political decision-
makers. Building on their formal and informal connections to other groups, elite organizations 
can do what is in the center of this dissertation: enable actors to get access to political 
influence. On the other hand, elite organizations have an interest in keeping the number of 
benefitting actors low. That is, elite closure is very likely. Given that elites were able to 
monopolize resources, elite actors have no direct incentive to reduce their individual share. 
Elite actors’ considerations might differ if political struggles can affect an elite’s interest in 
the long run, such as a general interest in protecting trade privileges from state interventions. 
In sum, we expected that there should be a potential for support but whether this support was 
provided or not turned out to be an empirical question since there are good arguments for both 
sides. 
The local elite of Bristol was organized in the Society of Merchant Venturers of the 
City of Bristol. Since political offices had a high relevance for political influence during this 
period (Rogers 1989), we evaluated data on local and national offices of members (Beaven 
1899) to understand how important the Society actually was. We also considered honorary 
memberships (Minchinton 1963). The results provided clear evidence that the Society was 
strongly embedded into the political system, both on the local and the national level. In other 
words, the Society qualified as the most important elite organization in our empirical analysis. 
Therefore, we used the official membership roster of the Society (Minchinton 1963) to 
identify elite members. In sum, we could use information on 393 members of the Society 
between 1700 and 1807. 
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 We collected ties between slave traders by refering to the well-established 
Transatlantic Slave Trade Database (Eltis, Berent, and Richardson 2008). This database 
includes the names of merchants who financed slave-trading ventures. We also included 
information on ventures in privateering and other trades, such as sugar or tobacco, to analyze 
trading sequences of merchants over time (Hillmann and Gathmann 2011; Morgan 1993; 
Powell 1930; Richardson 1996). Here, we could use information on 287 merchants who 
collaborated in 448 partnerships. These merchants and their overlap with the Society are in 
the center of our empirical analysis. 
 The data clearly showed that most slave-traders were not able to attain membership in 
the Society of Merchant Venturers. The rare exceptions were the most successful merchants, 
that is merchants who dealt in slave trade for a longer time and more often. This selection was 
due to increased entry barriers over time. In contrast to merchants from other trades, slave 
traders were significantly more likely to pay a fee to attain membership. Other modes of 
access such as kinship or apprenticeship were mostly reserved for merchants from other 
trades (see McGrath (1975) for details about the different modes of admission). In addition, 
slave traders constituted only a small share of the Society’s members. 
Although only a small minority of slave traders became members of the Society, they 
were central for the overall cohesion of the slave traders’ economic network. After deleting 
the 182 ties between members of the Society and ordinary slave traders, the percentage of 
unreachable pairs rose from about 56 percent to about 97 percent (see figure 2 for a graphical 
representation). The original paper lists additional measurements but all results pointed at the 
same direction. In order to clarify whether these descriptive results were systematic, we 
conducted two different network simulation procedures. First, we deleted 182 random ties 
from the observed network to see whether the decreased amount of the network’s cohesion 
was a result of the absolute number of deleted ties. Second, we simulated networks with the 
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same number of nodes and the same degree distribution and used the simulated networks 
instead of the observed one to delete 182 ties. A more detailed explanation of the procedure 
and the exact results can be found in the original paper. In sum, the results suggested that the 
ties between members and ordinary slave traders had a systematic relevance for the overall 
cohesion of the economic network. We interpreted that as evidence for the organizing 
capacity that the Society’s members could provide. In other words, the structural basis for a 
successful mobilization was given. 
 
Figure 2: The left graph shows the observed network of economic ties between the members of the Society 
(white squares) and ordinary slave traders (black circles). The two initials refer to two exemplary cases 
that are discussed in the original paper. The center graph uses the same coordinates to illustrate the 
network’s cohesion after we deleted ties between members and ordinary merchants. The right graph is 
based on optimized coordinates to show how members of the Society shape the biggest remaining 
component. Ordinary slave traders had no comparable component structure that could replace the 
cohesion provided by the members. 
 
However, the incentives for the elite members to use this potential in favor of the slave 
traders’ interest were small. Empirically, slave traders who attained membership in the 
Society of Merchant Venturers stopped to trade in slaves shortly after their membership. This 
general trend became stronger during the course of the 18th century and was strongest when 
the Abolitionists’ campaign started in 1787. Most likely, these trading patterns were due to 
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the higher risk of slave trade compared to other trades. Successful merchants were not forced 
to rely on such a risky endeavor anymore. Instead, they chose to pursue lower profits that 
were more predictable. The elite closure was therefore a direct consequence of the underlying 
economic incentives, which is in line with more general analyses of merchant guilds (Ogilvie 
2011). From the slave traders’ point of view, this mechanism prevented a successful 
activation of the economic ties for political purposes and left them in a structural disadvantage 
when the campaign against slave trade started. 
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II. Activists in Politics – The Influence of Embedded 
Activists on the Success of Social Movements 
The second paper is about intersection. In contrast to the first paper, the potential of 
intersection implies that actors can have two memberships at the same time. Therefore, 
possible cases for this type of social structure need to consider two kinds of memberships that 
are both theoretically combinable and empirically observable. In other words, the empirical 
membership to the elite may not exclude memberships outside, as it was the case with 18th 
century Bristol and the Society of Merchant Venturers. Thus, I chose to focus on an 
institutionalized elite and a group of actors that are specific enough to identify them but 
organized loosely enough to allow intersection. More specifically, I focused on members of 
parliament and the intersection with a social movement.  
The concrete empirical case, which I analyzed in the second paper, is the German 
antinuclear movement and its intersection with the Green party in regional and national 
parliaments. The term “activists in politics” summarizes the approach to focus on antinuclear 
activists that were able to make a career in the Green party up to a seat in parliament. Since 
this case includes a political elite, an identifiable group of actors outside the elite and the 
possibility for intersection, it is well suited to see how intersection is connected to access to 
political influence. From a more technical point of view, there are additional advantages. 
First, the antinuclear movement’s goals are clearly definable and therefore, a measurement of 
success is straightforward. Second, Germany’s federalist structure allows considering 
variation in intersection and success while comparing very similar political settings. Third, 
there is also variation over a long period of time, which can be used to disentangle general 
relations from time-varying dynamics. 
 18 
There are more detailed arguments in the original paper, but I basically argued that 
there are two main mechanisms concerning intersection. On the one hand, intersection has 
many advantages for social movements. First, intersection is based upon trust. Activists in 
politics have an intrinsic motivation to fight for their movement’s goals. Because of their 
history as activists, they are also perceived as “one of us” by the movement. These two 
aspects together create an access to the political elite that is way stronger than ties, since ties 
between two groups are vulnerable to rational calculations of either side. Second, intersection 
enables brokers to recombine resources of both networks (Evans and Kay 2008). In this 
specific case, the most important resources to combine are information from the inside of the 
political system and support of members of parliament by the social movement. Third, 
intersection gives activists access to insider tactics that are not available otherwise (see 
Banaszak (2005) for details). The combination of insider and outsider tactics is connected to 
an increased likelihood of social movements’ success (Olzak and Ryo 2007). 
On the other hand, intersection has also some disadvantages. First, a large number of 
activists in politics might endanger the social movement’s identity. Most social movements 
emerge because of a shared belief that the political system is unable or unwilling to act 
appropriate (Tilly 1999). If intersection increases, a social movement might react by restoring 
the distance to the political system, thereby decreasing the potential that intersection creates. 
Second, individual activists in politics might be confronted by role-conflicts. Since roles are a 
combination of internal identification and external application (Viterna 2013), tensions 
between the role of an activist and the role of a politician can lead to less efficient use of the 
brokerage position. Third, there is also a constant danger of cooptation, which is spelled out in 
the original paper but not crucial for the main argument. In sum, although there should be an 
overall positive effect of intersection on a movement’s success, there also should be a tipping-
point. I therefore expected to find an effect in form of an inverted U-shape. 
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I collected data to operationalize the two main concepts: success and intersection. In 
line with the antinuclear movement’s goals, I defined success as events, namely cases of 
prevented constructions or shutdowns of nuclear reactors. Information on the timing of these 
events came from the documents of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the 
official journal of the Deutsches Atomforum e.V., which is the association of German energy 
suppliers that own nuclear power stations. The operationalization of intersection was more 
complex. First, I collected the names of all members of parliament of the Green party on the 
regional and national level between 1972 and 2002. These 352 politicians constituted the 
subset of the political elite that might also have an activist background. In the next step, I 
collected biographies, historical records and parliamentarian questions to identify those actors 
that had an antinuclear background (see original paper for details). The actual value of 
intersection for each region was calculated as the proportion of politicians with an antinuclear 
background in the Green parliamentary group for each month. Therefore, the values range 
from zero to 100 percent. Most importantly, there was a lot of variation over time and 
between regions to use for a reliable statistical analysis. 
I followed an understanding of success as the result of cumulating influence over time 
(Tilly 1999), which is in line with a view on social movements’ struggle as a gradual process 
(Yamasaki 2009). To account for this conception, I applied event history analyses and defined 
the episodes as the time between success events. The tested research question therefore was: 
is higher intersection related to faster success? I also included a set of control variables, for 
instance a dummy to account for the period after the incident of Chernobyl and the shifting 
public opinion afterwards. To increase the results’ robustness, I also controlled for alternative 
explanations. The PRODAT dataset (see original paper for details) was used to construct a 
proxy for public pressure. Information of Greenpeace Germany about its budget development 
during the period in question entered the model as a proxy for the resources spend for 
 20 
lobbying. More technically, additional models tested whether different specifications of the 
underlying base hazards would alter the results (again, see original paper for details). 
Figure 3 illustrates the main result of the empirical analysis, namely the predicted 
hazards for each degree of intersection based on the main model. Both the linear and the 
quadratic effect were significant and pointed in the expected direction. That is, the results 
confirmed the inverted U-shape. In other words, the analysis provided evidence that 
intersection is an effective way for a social movement to get access to political influence and 
is related to the antinuclear movement’s rate of success.  
 
Figure 3: The x-axis shows different degrees of intersection and the y-axis the predicted hazards based on 
the main model of the original paper. The dashed line is calculated using the linear and quadratic 
coefficients for intersection (see original paper for details). The difference between the predicted hazards 
and the simplified function are due to opposing influence of other variables in the model. 
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III. Party Careers and Electoral Success – The 
Structural Effect of Political Parties on 
Candidates’ Success 
The third paper is about careers or about the question how actors get access to the 
political elite. Therefore, the transition itself is most important, implying that I needed 
information on the time before and after an actor attained elite membership. I decided to 
conduct this analysis by focusing on the members of parliament as an institutionalized 
political elite and the careers of political candidates that try to get into parliament. In order to 
focus on the general pattern, the empirical case needed to be one with an overall stable setting 
to minimize potential influences by macro developments, e.g., big shifts in the political 
landscape. Therefore, I carried out the analysis based on data about Norwegian candidates for 
parliament over a period of several decades. 
Perhaps the most prominent effect in the literature concerning parliamentary elections 
is the incumbency effect. Without going into the details, members of parliament that decide to 
rerun for office have a strong probability to defend their seats. This effect can be seen as one 
aspect of elite reproduction, which is an interesting question in itself but out of the scope of 
this dissertation. However, if this effect is strong, transitions into the elite are mainly possible 
when incumbents leave seats undefended. In sum, vacancies are a necessary precondition of 
actors to make a career and they are filled after an election with the most successful 
candidates. Another complication for candidates is that party lists are strongly correlated with 
the final result. Even if voters have the right to change the candidates’ order, they usually do 
not exercise this right. This is true both for random (Chen et al. 2014) and alphabetical lists 
(Webber et al. 2014). For instance, the correlation between party lists and the order of 
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candidates in Norway is 0.92. These findings shift the focus from individual candidates to the 
organizations that select them: political parties. 
Political parties decide on party lists according to their organizational goals. In 
general, the main goal of a political party is to maximize its influence in parliament to pursue 
their political agenda as strongly as possible. I argue in the paper why there are two qualities 
of candidates that are most important to achieve this goal: high political performance and 
loyalty. However, these qualities are not directly observable. Therefore, political parties need 
signals to reduce their uncertainty about the hidden qualities. The best choice is internal 
signals that are observable inside the party structure. These signals are more difficult to fake 
than signals outside the organization. The best signal for the ability to deliver a high political 
performance is the prominence of a candidate. The best signal for a candidate’s loyalty to 
fight for the party’s goals is the length of his or her party career. Given that political parties 
use these signals to recruit candidates, they should be strongly connected to candidates’ 
probability to make a career, i.e. to get a seat in parliament. 
I merged data provided by the Norwegian Social Science Data Services (NSD) to test 
the empirical implications of this argument (see original text for details). It is important to 
emphasize that the data includes both winning and losing candidates for the period between 
1946 and 2010. It also includes a measure for the exact place on the list for each candidate 
after the election. I especially focused on the information on party careers. Here, the data 
includes information on the sequence and level of the positions hold by each candidate. 
I conducted several generalized linear mixed-effects models that include a random 
intercept by politicians’ ID to account for unobserved heterogeneity and nested sequences of 
party careers (see original paper for details). Three models from the paper are most important. 
First, I calculated a complete model for all candidates. In this model, I used the whole range 
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of variation in success and party careers. Second, I calculated a separate model with the 
subset of candidates who had some sort of a party career. I used this for the internal 
comparison between different lengths of party careers and different levels of party offices. 
Third, I did another model with the subset of candidates that just missed or won a seat. 
The results of these three models are in line with the theoretical expectations. In the 
complete model, the effects of party offices and the length of a candidate’s party career point 
in the expected direction. Furthermore, there is a significant difference between offices on the 
national and lower levels. The effects of prominence and loyalty are also significant in 
explaining differences between candidates with a party background. Here, an office on the 
national level has the strongest impact on a candidate’s probability to win a seat in parliament. 
When it comes to close calls, the effect of a party career’s length disappears. Without going 
too much into the details, that might be due to a stronger effect of voters’ perception of a 
candidate. In other words, the structural effect of parties on election outcomes decreases when 
relatively few votes can make a difference. Refer to the original paper for more details both 
about the results and the interpretation.  
Since coefficients, respectively odds-ratios, can be misleading in this kind of model, I 
calculated predictions for each observation and compared them to the actual results, pictured 
in figure 4. The left bar for each model shows the percentage of correct predicted winning 
candidates, the right bars the percentage of correct predicted losing candidates. 
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Figure 4: Each bar indicates the number of correct predictions for the three models mentioned in the text. 
The left bars graph the correctly identified winners and the right bars the correctly identified election 
losers. The complete model is quite strong in the overall prediction pattern whereas the other two models 
show strength and weaknesses. 
 
The complete model is very strong in predicting election results. This finding supports 
the argument stated above, namely that party careers are strongly related to career success. In 
the case of party politicians, the predictions are especially good for winners but less so for 
losers. The results for close calls are also asymmetric. All these findings combined indicate 
that there is a strong structural effect of political parties on politicians’ success. On a more 
abstract level, the results suggest that making a career, that is attaining membership of the 
political elite, depends on the existing elite. 
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Conclusion and Outlook 
How do actors get access to political influence? Concerning the three types of 
underlying social structures, the main results of the three papers of this dissertation can be 
summarized as follows. First, the lack of utiliazable ties to the elite is a serious disadvantage 
in political struggles. Second, an intersection between a non-elite and the political elite has a 
measurable impact on the non-elite’s political success. Third, the elite itself controls the 
access to the elite. In each of these cases, the analytical frame proved to be fruitful for 
increasing our understanding of each empirical case. 
However, all three cases revealed more complicated mechanisms behind the respective 
social structures. First, political ties are dependent on ties in other areas of social life. In the 
case of Bristol, these ties were economic ones. Second, the opportunity for intersection 
depends on the existence of an allied group inside the political elite. That is, the specific 
social structure between non-elite and elite depends on the overall structure of the political 
arena. Third, if careers into the elite depend on decisions of elite members, non-elites have to 
adapt to the internal logic of the elite. 
On a more general level, the presence of ties, intersection or careers is a precondition 
of non-elites’ access to political influence. The presence alone, however, is not enough to 
infer political success. Actors need to be successful in using established bridges, they need to 
combine resources and they need to make a career. In other words, the social structure itself 
needs to be combined with information on the specific empirical case to create reliable 
insights and to increase our understanding. It is important to emphasize that these mechanisms 
and structures are not mutually exclusive. For instance, careers might lead to ties or 
intersections. Therefore, valid conclusions arise out of a careful combination of analytical 
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distinction and empirical evidence. The three papers of this dissertation showed how it is 
possible to analytically focus on one dominant mechanism without denying or ignoring the 
potential relevance of the other two. By doing so, the analytical frame presented above led to 
further insights. 
Based on these results, there are several areas for further research. First, each paper 
provided insights into the absolute relevance of a specific social structure but no setting was 
intended to allow a direct comparison between the three mechanisms. Further research needs 
to clarify under which conditions one mechanism is more successful than the other two or 
when and how they interact in what ways. Second, an emphasis on elite organizations would 
add to the picture developed here. How do the internal dynamics of these organizations 
influence external relations? How do formal and informal connections between actors 
interact? This possible line of research also hints at the possibility to develop a more fine-
grained measurement of elite membership. For instance, there is an internal hierarchy in elite 
organizations and the elite members’ position in it might strongly impact actors’ opportunities 
and incentives to connect to outside actors. Third, although I focused on the political elite, the 
basic mechanisms should be transferable to other kinds of elites, for instance economic or 
religious ones. The identification of an outside group might be more difficult but the basic 
arguments presented in this dissertation should hold nevertheless.  
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 A Closed Elite? 
Bristol’s Society of Merchant Venturers and the Abolition of Slave 
Trading 
Timo Böhm and Henning Hillmann 
Why, despite clear economic incentives, did eighteenth-century slave traders fail to 
defend their business interests against the abolition campaign? We focus on the outport of 
Bristol as a case in point. Our main argument is that slave traders lacked an organizational 
basis to translate their economic interests into political influence. Supporting evidence from 
merchant networks over the 1698-1807 period shows that the Society of Merchant Venturers 
offered such an organizational site for collective political action. Members of this chartered 
company controlled much of Bristol’s seaborne commerce and held chief elective offices in 
the municipal government. However, the Society evolved into an organization that 
represented the interests of a closed elite. High barriers to entry prevented the slave traders 
from using the Society as a vehicle for political mobilization. Social cohesion among slave 
traders outside the chartered company hinged on centrally positioned brokers. Yet the broker 
positions were held by the few merchants who became members of the Society, and who 
eventually ceased their engagement in slave trading. The result was a fragmented network 
that undermined the slave traders’ concerted efforts to mobilize against the political pressure 
of the abolitionist movement.  
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The case of early modern merchant companies offers a valuable opportunity for 
understanding how organized economic interests translate into political influence. Evidence 
from various historical settings suggests that traders who played similar roles within the 
networks of their merchant community also formed shared economic interests. They relied on 
the same trusted business partners in repeated overseas trading ventures, and they preferred 
the same creditors to obtain the funding necessary for their enterprises (Hancock 1995; 
Zahedieh 2010). These are just two examples of salient economic connections. What they 
illustrate is that reliance on shared positions within well-established webs of elite 
relationships may indeed have helped merchant traders to stay in business. But, more often 
than not, their shared economic interests required a political voice for merchants to obtain 
valuable trade privileges and to defend them against competing merchants in other ports. 
Drawing on our historical case and insights from comparable settings, we argue that 
their political voice was rarely heard unless merchants were able to coordinate their interests 
and multiple network affiliations into some cohesive organization (Gould 1995; Hillmann 
2008a). Our evidence suggests that chartered merchant companies provided such an 
organizational platform for political mobilization. In their capacity as formal organizations, 
the companies enabled economic elites to forge the strong bonds necessary for the successful 
translation of their economic interests into political influence. Still, as with other regulated 
and guild-like organizations, most merchant companies were created to protect the hard-won 
privileges of particular merchant elites, and few members were prepared to share their 
privileges with non-members (Ogilvie 2011). Access to membership was therefore restricted 
to a select group of traders. In other words, there are two sides to merchant companies: on the 
one hand, they provide an organizational platform that facilitates collective action; on the 
other, they hardly looked like generalized institutions and rather served the particular interests 
of a closed elite. 
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We consider the historical case of the Society of Merchant Venturers in eighteenth-
century Bristol as a case in point. For much of the period, Bristol was one of the leading ports 
in the wider British Atlantic economy as well as the Baltic and Iberian trades, second only to 
London and later Liverpool (Little 1967; Morgan 1993; Sacks 1991). Bristol’s merchants 
traded in colonial crops such as sugar and tobacco, had a vested interest in the shipping of 
slaves from Africa to the American plantation colonies, and engaged in privateering during 
times of war (Hillmann and Gathmann 2011). The most established and prominent members 
of the local merchant community organized themselves in the Society of Merchant Venturers. 
Initially founded as a merchant guild in the Late Middle Ages, and eventually granted its first 
royal charter as a trading company in 1552, the Society exerted considerable influence on the 
local politics in the city of Bristol and beyond (McGrath 1975; Minchinton 1963). 
We show how restricted access to the Society prevented up and coming members of 
Bristol’s merchant community from mobilizing themselves in defense of their economic 
interests. The particular group we focus on consists of the slave trading merchants within 
Bristol. Up until the late 1690s, the Royal African Company, based in London, enjoyed the 
monopoly right granted by its royal charter. The charter guaranteed company members 
exclusive access to and control of the English slave trade (Davies 1957). Multiple reasons 
contributed to the eventual demise of the Royal African Company. By 1698, mounting 
pressure from competing interloping merchants, among other factors, led Parliament to pass 
the Africa Trade Act, which obliged the Royal African Company to open the slave trade and 
to license private venturers (Carlos and Kruse 1996; Pettigrew 2007). Just like their 
competitors in other outports, Bristolian merchants seized the opportunity to enter the former 
monopoly trade. 
Investments in the transatlantic slave trade promised high returns for those willing to 
take the high risks it implied. Thus one James Jones, a Bristol merchant, noted that the 
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enterprise was “a precarious trade” where profits were “sometimes … good—sometimes not 
so” (quoted in Morgan 1993: 137-38; see also Richardson 1996). Still, the volatile nature of 
the slave trade attracted aspiring merchants in particular because any profits they made helped 
them to launch long-term careers in other, less uncertain overseas trades. And at least for a 
few of them, the prospect of riches opened opportunities to rise into the very elite ranks of 
their community. 
Figure 1 illustrates the scale of slave trading among the merchantry in the period from 
1698, when the English Parliament permitted independent private slavers to enter the trade, 
until 1807, when the House of Commons voted to outlaw the trading of slaves. All 
information on the number of slaves shipped and the merchants involved comes from the 
comprehensive Transatlantic Slave Trade Database (Eltis et al. 2008). The left-hand panel in 
figure 1 plots the number of slaves shipped by traders from Britain (England), North America, 
Denmark, France, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain, which constituted the leading 
commercial powers in the triangular trade across the Atlantic. The graph shows that the 
market volume did in fact increase over time. Decreases in the number of slaves traded during 
times of war were followed by recoveries to pre-war levels. Towards the end of our period of 
interest, France abolished the slave trade in 1794. Yet, after an initial downturn, the market 
was once again increasing in its volume. In short, the slave trade was flourishing by the time 
the British Parliament voted in favor of its abolition in 1807. 
  
Figure 1: Scale of Transatlantic slave trading, 1698-1807. The dashed line connects observed values for each year. The straight line represents the 10-year moving 
average. The source for the left-hand and center graphs is the Transatlantic Slave Trade Database (Eltis et al. 2008). Leading commercial powers refer to Britain 
(England), its North American colonies (later the United States), Denmark, France, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. The sources for the Bristol merchants in the 
right-hand graph are Eltis et al. (2008), Morgan (1993), Powell (1930), and Richardson (1996). 
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Obtaining robust estimates of profit from slave trading remains a thorny issue because 
few sources and samples are of comparable quality over time and across different contexts 
(Morgan 2000; Thomas and Bean 1974; Richardson 1987, 1989; Darity 1985, 1989). Darity 
(1985) arrives at an estimated profit rate between 10.3 and 24 percent for British slave traders. 
Anstey (1975) calculates profits of about 10 percent. More recently, Daudin (2004) estimates 
that eighteenth-century French slave traders could expect a profit rate of about 15.5 percent. 
Hence, scholars find some variation in the range of profit rates, but few would deny that the 
slave trade was a lucrative enterprise indeed. Likewise, there is little indication that 
profitability declined over time. 
Given that trading in slaves promised substantial returns, how large was the slice of 
the pie that British merchants could claim? The center panel in figure 1 shows that British 
merchants controlled a considerable share of the slave trading market throughout the 
eighteenth century. Even when advocates of the abolition movement gained political 
momentum in the 1790s, British slavers still benefitted from an international market share of 
at least 12 percent in 1798 and up to 67 percent in 1793. The average share in the 1787-1807 
period was equal to 41 percent (SD = 11.86). Still, one may suspect that other trades became 
just as attractive for promoters of overseas ventures, leading to increasing opportunity costs of 
investing in the slave trade. The right-hand panel in figure 1 depicts the pattern of 
replenishment among the ranks of slave traders in Bristol, our local setting. Clearly, younger 
cohorts of Bristolian merchants kept entering the slave trade throughout the eighteenth 
century. Fluctuations certainly occurred between subsequent years. Yet on average, 42 
percent of active slave traders in a given year between 1698 and 1807 were first-time partners 
in a venture (SD = 22.9). In sum, over the entire 1698-1807 period, and despite competing 
investment opportunities elsewhere, the slave trade remained a lucrative business, offered a 
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considerable market share for British merchants, and continued to attract new entrants among 
the local merchantry. 
These observations prompt our substantive historical question: why, despite such 
strong economic incentives, did the slave trading merchants fail to defend their enterprise and 
to resist the challenge of the abolitionists by the end of the eighteenth century? Political 
debates about its abolishment have always surrounded the slave trade (Pettigrew 2007). In 
1787, the founding of the Society for Effecting the Abolition of the Slave Trade invigorated 
the campaign, using educational programs, petitions and pamphlets to gain the support of the 
broader public and members of Parliament. In January 1788, the Bristol branch of the 
committee held its first public meeting and prepared petitions against the slave trade 
(Marshall 1968). Eventually, in 1807, the movement led a large majority in the House of 
Commons to vote for the abolition, although it would take at least another 25 years to enforce 
the end of slavery within the British Empire (Walvin 1981). We are certainly not denying that 
multifaceted reasons existed why the abolition movement gained the upper hand in their 
struggle against the slave trade, and against Bristolian traders in particular (for a recent 
comprehensive history of the abolition movement, see Pétré-Grenouilleau 2004, pp. 209-
311).1 We rather emphasize the importance of cohesive political organization, or more 
precisely, the lack thereof among the slave traders in Bristol. 
Briefly summarized, our main argument is that the Bristolian slave traders lacked an 
adequate organizational basis to align their economic interests into a collective political force 
that would have enabled them to garner support and to counter the abolitionists’ efforts. 
Supporting evidence for our argument comes from a list of all known slave trading 
                                                
1 Cultural influences such as the diffusion of an anti-slavery moral sentiment across Enlightenment Europe come 
to mind as an alternative reason. By its very nature, cultural diffusion is a long-run development and should not 
have an instantaneous effect on the behavior of all European merchants. Instead, if a growing anti-slavery 
sentiment did indeed influence these merchants, then we should observe a gradual decline in their engagement in 
the slave trade over time. Neither of the trends in figure 1 suggest empirical support for this cultural influence 
argument. 
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partnerships that involved Bristolian merchants over the 1698-1807 period, the roster of all 
members of the Society of Merchant Venturers, and the list of leading public officeholders in 
the City Council, Bristol’s municipal government. Drawing on these sources, we show that a 
local organization for political mobilization did in fact exist in the form of the Society of 
Merchant Venturers. As a chartered company that controlled much of Bristol’s seaborne 
commerce it was ideally suited to translate economic interests into political influence. Our 
findings indicate that a sizeable share of Society members occupied influential offices within 
the municipal government, including positions as mayors, aldermen, and sheriffs. However, 
over time, the Society evolved into an organization that represented the interests of a closed 
elite. It primarily granted membership to established merchant families, erected high barriers 
to entry, and denied its privileges to traders of lower social standing in the community (see 
McGrath 1975). As mentioned earlier, the high risk, high return nature of the slave trade often 
attracted novice merchants who were hopeful to use it as a starting point to launch a 
successful career in less uncertain trades. Due to their standing in the community, few among 
the slave traders were granted access to the company. The most common way to enter the 
Society was through apprenticeship and kinship ties that connected the candidates to existing 
members. Social closeness through elite family relationships between existing and aspiring 
members clearly was salient for the Society. The alternative option for those who lacked such 
family connections and appropriate social networks was to pay an entry fee. That it was still 
possible to pay for admission meant that entry barriers were not insurmountable. But paying 
the fee was an unmistakable signal of the social distance that separated an applicant from the 
elite families in the Society. We show that slave traders who applied for membership were 
increasingly much more likely required to pay an entry fee than members of the established 
merchant elite. Further, our findings suggest that those few merchants who did gain access to 
this elite organization tended to turn their backs to slave trading. 
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Finally, we turn to the network among the slave traders themselves. Whereas the 
Society of Merchant Venturers did not support their interests, we may suspect that their own 
network of partnership ties may have served as a foundation for collective political action. 
But as we shall demonstrate, whatever social cohesion existed in this network hinged on the 
presence of centrally positioned brokers who connected the various partnership clusters. As 
previous research on similar historical settings has shown, strategically placed brokers are 
essential for building political coalitions across the multiple networks that the protagonists are 
embedded in (Gould 1996; Hillmann 2008a, 2008b; Padgett and Ansell 1993). Unfortunately 
for the slave traders, the broker positions were primarily held by precisely those traders who 
became members of the Society and eventually ceased their engagement in slave trading 
partnerships. The consequence of these developments was a deeply fragmented network that 
undermined the slave traders’ concerted efforts to mobilize themselves against the mounting 
political pressure of the abolitionist movement. 
Data Sources 
Supporting evidence for our argument comes from a combination of three distinct data sets. 
The first set includes all 536 merchants in Bristol who are known to have traded in slaves at 
some time during the period from 1698 through 1807. We begin in 1698 when the former 
monopoly of the Royal African Company was effectively opened to private slave traders. We 
end our observation window in 1807, the year in which the British Parliament passed the act 
to abolish slave trading. Our main source of information on slave trading ventures that 
originated in the port of Bristol is the well-established Transatlantic Slave Trade Database 
(Eltis et al. 2008). We supplement these data with information on ventures in privateering and 
additional trades (e.g. tobacco and sugar) that the Bristolian slave traders were involved in 
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(Hillmann and Gathmann 2011; Morgan 1993; Powell 1930; Richardson 1996). On average, 
ventures consisted of about three merchants (mean = 3.18; SD = 1.63) who formed a business 
partnership to sponsor a trading voyage from Bristol. Many merchants were serial investors: 
on average, they financed about four ventures (mean = 3.86; SD = 6.73), and their careers as 
active sponsors of overseas trading voyages lasted for about eight years (mean = 7.8; SD = 
10.5; min—max = 1—66 years). We have complete information on 287 merchants who 
collaborated in 448 trading partnerships, and on 249 merchants who organized ventures on 
their own as single investors. 
Our second data set compiles the complete list of the 393 known members of the Society of 
Merchant Venturers during in the 1700-1807 period, as they are provided by Minchinton 
(1963).2 Four different avenues of admission to the chartered company existed for aspiring 
merchants (McGrath 1975). First, they could apply for membership after an apprenticeship 
period of at least seven years. Second, sons of existing members could be granted admission 
by patrimony. Third, admission by redemption was available to sons of existing members 
who had entered the Society by paying an admission fee. Finally, the fourth possibility was to 
pay an admission fee. During the eighteenth century, the admission fee increased from £50 up 
to £250. The main substantive distinction between the four procedures was that admission 
through apprenticeship, patrimony and redemption relied on existing social network ties to 
established members of the Society, whereas admission through payment of a fee signaled the 
social distance between Society elites and outsider merchants. Table 1 documents the 
distribution of admissions over time (1700-1807) according to the four different procedures. 
                                                
2 We are missing information on membership in the Society for the first two years of our observation window, 
1698 and 1699. However, the two missing years are not as salient for our substantive argument as the years 
towards the end of our observation window when the slave traders had to face the strengthened abolition 
campaign. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
  
Admission Procedure 
Decade  
Apprenticeship Patrimony Redemption Entry fee 
Total 
  Observations Percent Observations Percent Observations Percent Observations Percent 
1700-1710  28 65% 3 7% 2 5% 10 23% 43 
1711-1720  34 58% 2 3% 3 5% 20 34% 59 
1721-1730  31 60% 1 2% 9 17% 11 21% 52 
1731-1740  37 66% 4 7% 4 7% 11 20% 56 
1741-1750  12 60% 3 15% 5 25% . . 20 
1751-1760  12 63% 5 26% 2 11% . . 19 
1761-1770  10 30% 4 12% 3 9% 16 48% 33 
1771-1780  20 57% . . 11 31% 4 11% 35 
1781-1790  19 61% . . 5 16% 7 23% 31 
1791-1800  9 45% . . 8 40% 3 15% 20 
1801-1807  2 8% . . 3 12% 20 80% 25 
Total  214 54% 22 6% 55 14% 102 26% 393 
    
          
Table 1: Admissions to Bristol’s Society of Merchant Venturers, 1700-1807. Sources: Minchinton (1963) and McGrath (1975). Our observations begin in 1700 because 
we are missing information on membership for the two years 1698 and 1699. 
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Our third data set consists of all documented political officeholders in the municipal 
government of eighteenth-century Bristol, the city council. We draw all our information on 
officeholding merchants from Beaven (1899). Membership in the city council fluctuated 
around 40 councillors in any one year over our entire period. Our focus, however, is on the 
three chief elective offices that belonged to the executive branch of the local government 
(Seyer 1812): the position of the mayor, the members of the aldermen’s bench, and the 
positions as sheriffs. We have information on a total of 203 different officeholders in the 
years from 1698 through 1807. In what follows, we examine the officeholding careers of 
Society merchants and slave traders in detail. 
Local Politics and Elite Closure 
We first consider the role of the Society of Merchant Venturers within Bristol’s local 
politics. Holding offices within the municipal government was one of the most direct means 
of exercising political power in the city (Rogers 1989). The executive offices of the mayor, 
the members of the aldermen’s bench and the sheriff were among the most influential 
political positions and reflected the social standing of the incumbents in their community. 
Table 2 documents the distribution of these three political offices among members of the 
chartered Society of Merchant Venturers. 
Over the entire 1700-1807 period, members of the Society of Merchant Venturers were able 
to fill close to a quarter of the available positions. Society merchants represented 23 percent 
of the mayors, and claimed 25 percent of openings on the aldermen’s bench as well as 18 
percent of the sheriff positions. This pattern of officeholding shifted little over time. 
Naturally, the number of vacancies to be filled in each election cycle was limited. It is 
therefore not surprising that only a small group of 31 out of all 393 known members of the 
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Society of Merchant Venturers were elected into the three offices. Yet, beyond these chief 
elective offices, the historical record reveals that the 43-member strong City Council was 
dominated by “an elite corps of Merchant Venturers comprising 30-40 per cent of total 
membership in any one year” (Rogers 1989, p. 264). Likewise, the same elite of Merchant 
Venturers was equally successful in recruiting the political support of national grandees by 
granting up to 59 honorary memberships in our period of interest (Minchinton 1963). Such 
honorary members included the Lord of Trade (in 1763), two Prime Ministers (in 1764 and 
1789), and several Members of Parliament (in 1727, 1755, 1759, 1768, 1775, 1790, and 
1796). Both the enlistment of prestigious national elites and officeholding within the 
municipal government reflected the predominance of commercial interests in Bristol politics 
during the eighteenth century. As historian Nicholas Rogers (1989, p. 263) aptly put it, 
“organized through the Society of Merchant Venturers, merchants were effectively able to 
determine the town's economic priorities and to marginalize competing interests.” 
Certainly, a few slave traders outside of the Society were able to win public offices as 
well, but their political cachet was rather limited. In particular, in the years from the 1780s 
onwards when the abolition movement gained political momentum, merely five slave traders 
were elected, and they filled only 15 office vacancies. Further, slave traders who held offices 
were hardly typical representatives of the Bristolian slave traders at large. On average, they 
could boast much longer careers in commerce (mean = 20.1 years; SD = 15.2) compared to 
slave traders who never held any office (mean = 8.8 years; SD = 12.3). Likewise, they were 
involved as partners in more than twice as many trade ventures (mean = 4.9 partnerships; SD 
= 7.0) than their peers without offices (mean = 2.0 partnerships; SD = 2.0). 
  
  
 
 
 
 
                   
Decade  
Mayor  Aldermen  Sheriff 
  All officers Officers in Society  All officers Officers in Society  All officers Officers in Society 
1700-1710  2 .  . .  21 2 
1711-1720  11 1  9 1  20 8 
1721-1730  10 6  9 5  19 4 
1731-1740  10 4  8 3  16 2 
1741-1750  11 2  9 3  12 . 
1751-1760  10 1  6 1  15 3 
1761-1770  10 1  12 1  10 4 
1771-1780  8 3  8 2  8 . 
1781-1790  10 3  11 4  13 2 
1791-1800  8 1  9 2  11 2 
1801-1807  4 .  6 .  3 . 
Total   94 22  87 22  148 27 
Table 2: Political Officeholding Among Members of Bristol’s Society of Merchant Venturers, 1700-1807. The table reports the number of persons elected to the offices 
of the mayor, aldermen, and sheriff in Bristol's municipal government. Our observations begin in 1700 because we are missing information on membership in the 
Society of Merchant Venturers for the two years 1698 and 1699. Sources: Beaven (1899); Minchinton (1963) and McGrath (1975). 
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What our findings suggest, then, is that access to company membership facilitated 
access to influential political positions. That is, the political weight and the company 
organization of the Society of Merchant Venturers would have been ideally suited for the 
slave traders to mobilize themselves and to defend their economic interests. But they could 
only rely on this organizational vehicle if the Society welcomed the slave traders in their 
midst. Table 3 compares the means whereby slave traders and merchants who invested in 
other trades were granted membership in the Society. We distinguish between two principal 
means of gaining access. Applicants could either invoke social ties to existing members of the 
Society, through apprenticeship, patrimony, or redemption. Or, alternatively, they could 
request admittance by paying an entry fee. The main idea here is that admittance through 
family and social ties implies deeper embedding in the networks of the elite corps of the 
Society to begin with, whereas admittance through payment suggests greater social distance 
of the applicants from the elite (see McGrath 1975). 
Three important results emerge from table 3. First, considering the total number of 
new members from both groups of merchants shows that reliance on family and social ties to 
existing members was the preferred means of admission to the company. Second, the Society 
granted membership to only 99 out of all 536 documented slave traders over the entire period. 
Put differently, the vast majority of slave traders (82 percent) were never admitted, and those 
who were admitted accounted for only one quarter of all 393 new members.3 Third, we 
observe a clear shift in the admission pattern among the slave traders over time. Up until 
                                                
3 One may wonder if a change in the proportion of slave traders among the population of Bristol merchants 
explains our observation. To the best of our knowledge, a census of all merchants in Bristol for our entire period 
is not available. But a comparison of all known slave traders across the quartiles of our historical period shows 
that their number remained substantial over time: there were 240 slave traders in the first quartile (1700-1726), 
335 in the second quartile (1727-1753), 225 in the third quartile (1754-1780), and still 137 in the fourth quartile 
(1781-1807), when the abolition movement gained in political influence. Despite the still substantial pool of 
slave traders, the number of slavers admitted to the Society declined steadily: 41 admissions in the first quartile, 
28 in the second quartile, 17 in the third quartile, and merely 13 in the fourth quartile. Unfortunately, we do not 
have any information about the number of slavers who attempted but failed to gain entry. It seems safe to 
assume that the number of attempts was greater than zero. If anything, then, our findings are lower-bound 
estimates of elite closure in the Society. 
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about mid-century, slave traders predominantly relied on their social networks of family and 
apprenticeship relations with existing members to gain access. From the 1780s onwards, 
however, the Society required the majority (67 to 75 percent) of slave traders to pay an 
admission fee, presumably because these new cohorts were not or only weakly related to the 
elite families who dominated the Society. In contrast, as table 3 shows, new members coming 
from other trades were still primarily admitted on the basis of their kinship and social 
relations. Our findings thus indicate an increasing closure of the merchant elite corps in the 
Society, whereby it also became increasingly more difficult for aspiring slave traders who 
lacked the necessary family connections to gain entry. Welcomed they were no longer, it 
seems. 
But perhaps the few slave traders who did gain admission were sufficient to use the 
Society as an organizational site for creating an alliance among their own supporters and 
merchant members of the Society to collectively counter the abolitionists. Such a successful 
political mobilization would have required mediation between two separate merchant 
networks: it would have implied that they were able to forge new ties within the Society and 
at the same time to maintain bonds with their slave trading peers (see Hillmann 2008a). 
Recall that political opposition to the slave trade began in earnest with the founding of the 
Society for Effecting the Abolition of the Slave Trade in 1787. We therefore consider the 90 
slave traders who had been admitted as new members to the Society by 1787. Figure 2 
contrasts their involvements in slave trading ventures before and after they became members 
of the Society of Merchant Venturers. 
 
 
  
 
 
                         
  Slave traders Merchants from other trades 
Decade  
Admission through networks Entry fee paid Admission through networks Entry fee paid 
 Observations Percent Observations Percent Observations Percent Observations Percent 
1700-1710  7 70% 3 30% 26 79% 7 21% 
1711-1720  13 54% 11 46% 26 74% 9 26% 
1721-1730  6 55% 5 45% 35 85% 6 15% 
1731-1740  12 75% 4 25% 33 83% 7 18% 
1741-1750  7 100% . . 13 100% . . 
1751-1760  5 100% . . 14 100% . . 
1761-1770  3 38% 5 63% 14 56% 11 44% 
1771-1780  5 100% . . 26 87% 4 13% 
1781-1790  2 33% 4 67% 22 88% 3 12% 
1791-1800  1 25% 3 75% 16 100% . . 
1801-1807  1 33% 2 67% 4 18% 18 82% 
Total   62 63% 37 37% 229 78% 65 22% 
Table 3: Admissions of slave traders to Bristol’s Society of Merchant Venturers, 1700-1807. Admission through networks includes apprenticeship, 
patrimony and redemption. Our observations begin in 1700 because we are missing information on membership in the Society of Merchant Venturers for 
the two years 1698 and 1699. Sources: Minchinton (1963) and McGrath (1975) for membership in the Society of Merchant Venturers; Eltis et al. (2008), 
Morgan (1993), Powell (1930), and Richardson (1996) for trading activities of Bristol's merchants. Significant difference in admission patterns between 
slave traders and merchants from other trades: chi-2 = 20.342, df = 10, p = 0.026. 
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The two graphs reveal a crisp pattern in the relationship between slave traders and 
membership in the Society over time. The left-hand panel shows that slave traders who joined 
the Society closer to the end of the eighteenth century had spent significantly longer careers in 
the slave trade than their peers who became Society members around the beginning of the 
century. For instance, the average career length of slave traders who entered the Society in 
1775 was about 20 years compared to just 8 years for those who became members in 1725. In 
other words, the Society increasingly attracted those merchants who tended to be fairly long 
and well established in the slave trade.4 However, the complementary panel to the right shows 
a clear trend of decreasing involvement in the slave trade over time among those who were 
admitted as new members to the Society. Again, those who entered the Society in 1775 
continued their sponsorship of slave trading ventures for about 8 years, on average, whereas 
those who became new members in 1700 continued to trade for another 22 years, on average. 
Combining the findings from both graphs thus suggests that it was precisely the set of 
venturers with long-standing careers and probably prominent positions in the slave trade who 
ceased their commitment once they became members of the Society. 
 
                                                
4 The shift in career trajectories indicates that the average age of new entrants increased over time, but we do not 
have systematic information on age at the time of entry into the Society to confirm this. It is certainly 
conceivable that the Society increased its selection on experience primarily to assert its status as an association 
of elite merchants rather than to explicitly exclude slave traders. But whatever the Society’s motives behind the 
selection policy were, its negative structural consequences for the slave traders’ political mobilization remain the 
same, namely network fragmentation and decreasing brokerage. 
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Figure 2: Slave traders who gained admission to the Society of Merchant Venturers by 1787. The figure 
shows the observed number of years that Society members spent in the slave trade before they became 
members of the Society (left-hand graph) and after they became members (right-hand graph). The 
straight lines represent linear regression estimates, including the 95 percent confidence interval. N = 90 
slave trading members of the Society. 
 
The patterns of investment sequences of the 90 traders lend further support to this 
interpretation of increasing disengagement from the slave trade. Eighteen amongst them 
stopped their involvement in slave trade partnerships immediately once they had become 
members of the Society. Eleven new members ended trading altogether within five years of 
their admission. Fourteen former slave traders switched their investments into entirely 
different trades after they had become Society members. Another 19 venturers continued 
trading in slaves, but they only gained admission by paying a fee, which indicates their lower 
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standing and social distance from the elite members of the Society. Out of the remaining 28 
new members who continued their involvement in the slave trade merely two cases were 
active in the second half of the eighteenth century, and thus could have contributed to any 
political efforts. 
Why, then, was there no basis for successful mediation and alliance building? In sum, 
our findings indicate first that the Society of Merchant Venturers increasingly became an 
organization of a closed elite with barriers to entry for most slave traders. Merchants in other 
trades continued to use their social networks to existing members to enter the Society. In 
contrast, the few slave traders who obtained membership typically were required to pay a fee. 
Of course, even an entry fee of up to £250 may be considered nominal by some (McGrath 
1975, p. 103). More significant was the mark of social distance to the elite merchants of the 
Society that it left. Second, however, our case is not just a story of denial of access to a 
chartered company that served as an important economic and political organization. 
Unfortunately for the slave traders, precisely the most established amongst them, and thus 
presumably the ones best positioned to forge alliances, were also the ones who ceased their 
active commitment to the slave trade once they became members of the Society.5 Both 
developments—elite closure and prominent traders pulling out of their former networks—
undermined whatever concerted efforts existed among the slave traders to defend their 
business interests against the mounting pressure from the abolitionists. 
                                                
5 A means comparison of the number of trade partnerships attests to the prominent role of Society members 
within the network of slave traders. Society members maintained about as twice as many partnerships (mean = 
5.2; SD = 6.4) than the slave traders who did not become members of the Society (mean = 2.4; SD = 3.5; p = 
0.000).  
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The Fragmented Network of the Slave Traders 
Another alternative for the slave traders was to mobilize themselves even without the 
organizational support of the Society of Merchant Venturers. To do so, they required 
sufficiently cohesive networks to enable the communication and coordination necessary for 
successful collective action. Table 4 documents the extent of cohesion in Bristol’s slave trader 
network, using various indicators. Recall that we have information on a total of 536 
merchants who traded in slaves at some point during the entire 1698-1807 period. Only those 
merchants who formed partnerships for their ventures could have potentially contributed to 
social cohesion among the slave traders. We therefore exclude the 249 merchants who 
organized trade ventures single-handed (that 46 percent of the slave traders are isolates in 
their primary business area already hints at the limited cohesion in the trader’s network). This 
leaves us with 287 merchants who partnered in a total of 448 ventures. In addition, we can 
identify 72 among these merchant partners as members of the Society of Merchant Venturers. 
We combine this information into a symmetric network matrix (287x287), where pairs of 
merchants are linked if they partnered in a trading venture. Cell entries are equal to zero in the 
absence of a joint partnership. 
 
 
                                
       
Network cohesion 
     Partnership ties  Components  
Period Network scope Merchants 
Society 
members 
(percent)  
N Among members Bridges 
Among 
non-
members 
Isolates  N 
Size main 
component 
(percent) 
Mean 
size SD size 
Perc. un-
reachable 
pairs 
1698-
1807 
all partnership 
ties 287 72 (25.1)  448 97 182 169 0  44 190 (66.2) 6.52 28.31 56.1 
without bridges 287 72 (25.1)  266 97 0 169 87  53 41 (14.3) 2.05 3.85 97.1 
                
1698 - 
1787 
all partnership 
ties 251 69 (27.5)  365 94 137 134 0  36 171 (68.1) 6.97 28.13 53.5 
without bridges 251 69 (27.5)  228 94 0 134 76  45 34 (13.5) 2.07 3.46 97.3 
                
1787 - 
1807 
all partnership 
ties 47 7 (14.9)  87 3 49 35 0  11 14 (34.1) 4.27 4.82 82.1 
without bridges 47 7 (14.9)  38 3 0 35 17  12 5 (10.6) 1.62 0.94 97.5 
                                
                Table 4: Indicators of social cohesion in the slave traders’ partnership network in Bristol, 1689-1807. Sources: Eltis et al. (2008), Morgan (1993), Powell 
(1930), and Richardson (1996). Component sizes refer to the number of merchants within components. All component sizes are greater than 1, and 
components equal to 1 are listed as isolates. 
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One indicator of cohesion in the partnership network is the distribution of components. 
Technically, components refer to discrete groups within a network graph such that all 
members of a given component are linked by at least one pathway, using both direct and 
indirect ties between them. In addition, components are mutually exclusive with no bridging 
ties between them. Consequently, a small number of components indicate cohesion within the 
merchant partnership network, whereas a large number of components imply structural 
fragmentation into numerous separate subgroups. If we consider first the entire network 
throughout the 1698-1807 period, we observe a separation into 44 different components, each 
consisting of 6 to 7 members, on average. This observation suggests fragmentation, rather 
than cohesion. However, a majority of 190 traders (or 66 percent of the total) are connected 
within the main component. And given its extent of internal connectivity, the main 
component appears to have been an ideal site for collective political mobilization among the 
slave traders. What undermined this potential for collective action was the dependence of the 
slave trader’s network on bridging ties that linked members and non-members of the Society 
of Merchant Venturers. The 182 observed bridges account for 41 percent of all partnerships in 
the network during the 1698-1807 period. Hence, social cohesion within the trader network 
hinged on brokers who bridged between members of the Society on the one hand, and slave 
traders outside of the Society on the other. Further, as we have seen in the previous section, 
the Society members who contributed to the maintenance of such bridges were the ones who 
tended to retreat from their slave trading partnerships, and they increasingly did so by the 
time the abolition campaign gained in political strength. In table 4 we replicate the potential 
consequences for cohesion when these critical bridging ties are removed from the network. 
The consequences are rather dramatic because the removal of bridges reduces the size of the 
main component to just 14 percent of all traders in the network. In other words, the one area 
within the network that is most cohesive and thus best suited for collective action is also the 
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one most vulnerable to the breakdown of bridges. And it was precisely the retreat of Society 
members from the slave trade that facilitated the breakdown of bridges. Our interpretation is 
further supported by the observation that the proportion of trader pairs that cannot reach other 
within the network increases just as dramatically from 56 up to 97 percent once we remove 
the bridging ties. 
The network graphs in figure 3 visualize our systematic results in table 4. The left-
hand graph shows the complete partnership network among all 287 traders over the entire 
1698-1807 period. We employ a spring-embedding algorithm where the distance between 
traders is proportional to the shortest path linking them and the overlap among nodes and ties 
is minimized. Clearly visible is the large cohesive main component at the center of the 
network. The two initials, JJ and HB, refer to two exemplary cases that represent the kinds of 
brokers who maintained the bridges between Society members and non-members (the 
biographical information comes from Beaven 1899 and Richardson 1996). Joseph Jefferis 
exemplifies prominent slave traders at the beginning of the eighteenth century who typically 
entered the Society through an apprenticeship relation. As a member of an established 
merchant family in Bristol, he was elected into the offices of Sheriff (1715), Mayor (1724), 
and Alderman (1725). In contrast, Henry Bright illustrates the slave trading brokers in later 
years who had to pay an admission fee to become a member of the Society (he did so in 
1775). Bright also held the offices of the Sheriff (1753) and Mayor (1771). 
The center graph in figure 3 uses exactly the same coordinates as the left-hand graph 
to visualize how much the removal of the 182 bridging ties reshapes the pattern of ties into a 
fragmented network. Finally, the right-hand graph depicts the same fragmented network as 
the center graph, but optimizes its layout to avoid the overlap of ties and traders in the 
drawing. 
  
Figure 3: Cohesion and fragmentation in the trader’s partnership network, 1698-1807. The left-hand graph shows the complete network among the 287 
Bristolian merchants who formed 448 trade partnerships. Network ties link merchants if they were business partners in the same venture. White squares represent 
members of the Society, black circles represent traders who were not members of the Society. The center graph shows the same network after the removal of the 182 
bridging ties between Society members and non-members. The right-hand graph optimizes the layout of the center-graph to avoid overlapping nodes and ties in the 
display. The red squares and initials refer to two exemplary brokers between Society members and non-members (see main text for details). The sources for the 
partnership ties among the Bristol merchants are Eltis et al. (2008), Morgan (1993), Powell (1930), and Richardson (1996). 
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The evidence we have presented thus far is based on the complete trading partnership 
network over the entire 1698-1807 period. Using this complete network offers a conservative, 
lower-bound estimate of the extent of fragmentation because it presumes that ties never decay 
and traders never die. It thus privileges cohesion over fragmentation. One may suspect, 
however, that the selection of trade partners and formation of partnership ties after 1787 was 
strongly influenced by the political activities of the abolitionists. For this reason, we 
calculated the same indicators of cohesion and fragmentation for the 1698-1787 and the 1787-
1807 networks. The results are reported in table 4 and confirm the direction of our findings 
for the entire 1698-1807 period network: once again, the networks depend on bridging ties for 
their cohesion; likewise, removing the bridging ties substantially decreases the percentage of 
traders in the main component and increases the proportion of trader pairs that cannot reach 
other using their direct or indirect network ties. 
Further robustness checks demonstrate that the extent of fragmentation in the observed 
network is unlikely to have emerged by chance alone. For the 1698-1807 period, we started 
with the observed network of 287 traders and their 448 partnerships. But instead of the 182 
known bridges, we selected a random set of 182 ties and removed them from the network. We 
then calculated the cohesion and fragmentation indicators. We repeated these steps for a total 
of 1,000 iterations. In table 5, we compare the simulation results with the observed network. 
The p-value reports the proportion of the 1,000 simulated networks that exhibit a similar or 
even higher degree of fragmentation compared to our observed network. For example, in only 
2.1 percent of the 1,000 simulated networks do we find as many or more isolates as in the 
observed network once we have removed 182 randomly chosen ties. As an alternative 
solution, we followed the same steps, but used 1,000 randomly generated networks with the 
same number of nodes (traders) and degree distribution as we find in the observed network. 
As table 5 shows, nearly all p-values for both versions of the simulated tie removal are very 
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low, which suggests that the extent of fragmentation in the observed network was not a 
chance outcome.6 It rather suggests a social process whereby the bridges between members 
and non-members of the Society created cohesion, and their absence gave rise to 
fragmentation in the slave trader network.7 
Alternative Sources of Cohesion 
The main inference to be drawn from our results is that the slave traders’ network was 
vulnerable to fragmentation caused by the withdrawal of brokers, and thus lacked an adequate 
social relational basis for collective action. But perhaps we missed some unobserved social 
bonds that created sufficient cohesion among the slave trading merchants of Bristol. For 
instance, as obvious candidates, kinship ties among the traders may have facilitated 
cooperation and filled the structural holes in the fragmented network we observe. We have 
such kinship information for some of the merchants in our data, but not for a large enough 
number of cases to explore this scenario systematically. Of course, one could simulate the 
consequences of adding alternative network ties, but it would do little more than express in 
numbers the substantive truism that additional ties will increase cohesion. Likewise, if such 
alternative relationships were indeed as salient for these Bristolian traders, then whatever 
influence they had on the formation of business ties should in fact be expressed in the very 
pattern of the partnership network we observe (see Richardson 1996). 
 
                                                
6 The one exception is the p = .90 result for the number of isolates in the randomly generated graphs. One 
explanation is that the degree distribution in the observed network is driven by dense local clustering in the main 
component, as shown in figure 3 (note that this property of the network is preserved in our first simulation 
version). In contrast, randomly generated networks tend to exhibit far less local clustering, and therefore fewer 
redundant connections. Consequently, the removal of ties is also likely to create more isolates than in a locally 
clustered network. 
7 We obtained similar simulation results for the 1698-1787 and 1787-1807 period networks that confirm our 
interpretation. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
             
   
Extent of network fragmentation after removal of bridges 
 Merchants  Isolates 
Number of components  
(size > 1) 
Merchants in main 
component (percent) 
Percent unreachable 
pairs 
Observed fragmentation 287  87 53 41 (14.3) 97.1 
       
P (Simulation 1) 287  0.021 0.001 0.000 0.000 
       
P (Simulation 2) 287  0.910 0.007 0.007 0.001 
              
       
Table 5: Robustness checks of fragmentation in partnership networks, 1698-1807: simulation of removal of bridging ties. The observed fragmentation 
shows the decrease in network cohesion after the removal of the 182 bridging ties between members and non-members of the Society of Merchant 
Venturers (see table 4). Simulation 1 reports the decrease in cohesion after the removal of 182 randomly selected ties in the observed network (1,000 
iterations). Simulation 2 reports the decrease in cohesion after the removal of 182 randomly selected ties in randomly generated graphs with the same 
number of nodes and degree distribution as we find in the observed network (1,000 iterations). The P-values report the proportion of the 1,000 simulated 
networks that have at least as many isolates, at least as many number of components, the same or smaller percent of merchants in the main component, 
and a percent of unreachable pairs that is as high as in the observed network. 
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One set of ties that were salient for eighteenth-century Bristol concerned the political 
alignments with either the Whig or the Tory party. As in other British towns of the time, the 
cleavage between the two opposing political factions ran deep through the merchant 
community of Bristol and influenced the choice of business partnerships (Rogers 1989; 
Trapido 2013). Because the struggle between abolitionists and slave traders was a political 
one as well, it is conceivable that the slave traders sought to align their interests with either 
the Whig or the Tory party. Even though neither entailed a formal party structure in the 
modern sense, such alignment of interests could have provided the slave traders with a useful 
organizational platform that they lacked otherwise. We have information on the political party 
preferences for a total of 417 voters in several elections during our period: 35.7 percent voted 
for the Tories and 64.3 percent for the Whigs. In addition, we also know the political leanings 
of 134 among the slave traders in our data. Their political preferences are virtually 
indistinguishable from the 417 voters at large: 35.8 percent of the slave traders voted for the 
Tories and 64.2 percent for the Whigs. Hence, we find no evidence to support the argument 
that the slave traders achieved cohesion by aligning themselves with one of the two opposing 
political parties. Considering struggles surrounding the slave trade monopoly and abolition 
earlier in the eighteenth century, Pettigrew (2007, p.17) likewise finds that the “individuals 
involved doubtless maintained opinions that would categorize them as either Whig or Tory. 
(…) Party labels perhaps stimulated early momentum for both side’s cause. Yet they did not 
decide the issue. (…) Party networks did not supply a decisive means for either faction to 
mobilize sympathetic constituents. (…) The expansion of Britain’s slave trade, like its 
abolition, had cross-party appeal.” 
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Success of the Abolitionist Campaign 
Here we have identified some of the critical organizational obstacles that undermined 
the mobilization of the slave trading merchants in the face of growing political pressure from 
the abolitionists. What, then, were the local events on the ground that eventually triggered the 
success of the abolitionist movement in Bristol? If we consider the role of the Society of 
Merchant Venturers, the available historical information evokes an ambivalent strategy. On 
the one hand, the company merchants of the Society displayed rather lukewarm sympathy for 
the advocates of abolition. The plausible reason was that ending the slave trade would have 
had a negative impact on the supply of forced labor in the West Indian plantations, and hence 
ruinous consequences for Bristol’s position in the colonial trade with Africa and the 
Caribbean (Marshall 1968). Therefore, the company merchants had few economic incentives 
to lend their support to the abolitionist movement. On the other hand, their business interests 
and lack of enthusiasm for anti-slavery agitation did not mean that the company merchants 
took the lead in organizing the local opposition to the abolition activists. Instead of playing a 
prominent role, the Society merchants preferred to keep a low profile in this particular 
political contest. If necessary, they offered meeting rooms and other resources. Yet, as our 
findings show, they were hesitant to admit slave traders as members and to maintain trading 
partnerships with them. The ambivalent position of the Society elite toward the slave trade 
was also reflected in the report of one Thomas Clarkson, a member of London’s abolition 
committee who was sent to Bristol in 1787. Clarkson observed that “every body seemed to 
execrate it, though no one thought of its abolition” (quoted in Marshall 1968, p. 2). 
In 1792, a pivotal moment came that tipped public sentiment in favor of the local 
protest against slavery. Abolition activists had already unearthed a long legacy of fraud, 
violence and even murder on board of British slave ships. The high death toll also included 
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seamen serving on the vessels, and several captains were apparently involved in the 
brutalities. In April 1792, John Kimber, captain of the Recovery, a slaver owned by Bristol 
merchants, was put on trial before the High Court of Admiralty for maltreatment that led to 
the violent death of a 15 year old girl on board of his ship. The trial and ensuing public 
outrage endangered the reputation of those who continued to oppose the cause of the abolition 
movement. Finally, an economic crisis in the wake of war with revolutionary France hit 
Bristol’s merchant community. The resulting shortage of mercantile credit led to the 
bankruptcy of many Bristol traders, including a number of prominent slave ship owners. What 
brought the interest of Bristol’s merchantry in the slave trade to an end was the sudden loss of 
financial support, combined with the moral outrage following the Kimber case (Marshall 
1968). 
Conclusion 
We began with the substantive historical question why, despite clear economic 
incentives, the Bristolian slave traders failed to defend their business interests in the face of 
the abolitionists’ campaign. We acknowledge that a variety of causes led to the eventual 
success of the abolition movement in Britain (see Pétré-Grenouilleau 2004, pp. 223-28, 234-
53). Among these causes, we emphasized the important role of merchant companies as 
political organizations. In particular, we argued that the lack of a cohesive organizational 
platform undermined whatever efforts of collective political mobilization the slave traders 
undertook. We presented supporting evidence that the chartered company of the Society of 
Merchant Venturers offered such an organizational site for collective political action. 
Members of the Society held chief elective offices in the municipal government and exercised 
considerable political influence. However, increasingly high barriers to entry—such as 
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admission through fees rather than social networks—prevented most slave traders from 
accessing and using the Society as a vehicle for their own political mobilization. The few who 
did gain access to the Society typically were the most established among the slave traders, and 
thus were ideally positioned as brokers to mediate between the otherwise separate networks of 
the Society members and the slave traders. Most unfortunate for the slave traders’ ambitions, 
these well-positioned merchants tended to cease their engagements in the slave trade once 
they had been admitted to the Society. Finally, their retreat from slave trading exposed how 
vulnerable the traders’ network was to structural fragmentation. In sum, these pieces of 
evidence document how much the lack of cohesive organization contributed to the failure of 
collective political action among the slave traders. 
Two broader lessons for understanding the role of merchant companies emerge from 
our case. The first emphasizes their importance as economic organizations that facilitated 
collective political mobilization. As we have stated repeatedly, merchant companies offered 
an organizational vehicle that helped its members to forge the cohesive bonds necessary for 
translating their economic interests into political influence. The historical evidence suggests 
that many slave traders in Bristol did recognize that they shared similar economic interests 
and positions in the local and national merchant networks. Yet their case also illustrates that 
structural equivalence and shared interests alone are rarely sufficient for successful political 
mobilization. One is reminded of Karl Marx’ Eighteenth Brumaire, in particular his portrait of 
the small peasants who “form a vast mass, the members of which live in similar conditions, 
but without entering into manifold relations with one another (…), much as potatoes in a sack 
form a sackful of potatoes.” Consequently, “the identity of their interests begets no unity, no 
national union, and no political organisation” (Marx [1852] 1978, p.608). Returning to the 
Bristolian traders, the implication is that they had to coordinate their interests within some 
cohesive organization if they wanted their political voice to be heard. In our historical setting, 
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the Society of Merchant Venturers provided precisely such a cohesive organization for 
collective political action. 
The second lesson, however, is that merchant companies like the Bristolian Society of 
Merchant Venturers more often than not served the particular interests of a closed elite. We 
are of course not the first to note the consequences of open versus closed elite systems in 
early modern European history (Stone and Stone 1984; Padgett 2010; McLean 2004). What 
seems important to us is rather the inherently ambivalent, double-edged nature of such 
merchant elite companies. On the one hand, they provided an institutional framework that 
facilitated trade relationships, the protection of hard-won monopoly rights, and the 
coordination of collective political action. On the other hand, early modern merchant 
companies, much like medieval guilds, were particularized institutions that limited access to 
these organizational benefits to their members (Ogilvie 2011). In our historical case, both the 
increasingly high entry-barriers and the limited number of bridges to networks beyond the 
boundaries of the company document its exclusive nature. Similar to other merchant 
companies, Bristol’s Society of Merchant Venturers constituted an enabling and a restricting 
organization in equal measure. To conclude, if we wish to understand the role of economic 
merchant companies as political organizations, it should be just as important to understand the 
closeness and openness of their underlying membership networks. 
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 Activists in Politics 
The Influence of Embedded Activists on the Success of Social 
Movements 
 
Timo Böhm 
 
Social movements strive for policy changes that will realize their conception of the ‘perfect 
world’. To achieve their aims as rapidly as possible, movements attempt to identify the 
most effective ways to influence decision-makers. In parliamentary democracies, the 
central decision-makers are political parties. Much of the existing literature emphasizes 
the use of public pressure and lobbying. In contrast, I argue that the intersection between 
political parties and social movements is the strongest and most stable means for activists 
to influence policy. Using novel microdata on the German antinuclear movement, 
particularly its success in influencing the shutdown of nuclear power plants, I demonstrate 
that movements realize their goals significantly more rapidly when their intersection with 
political parties increases. My results also suggest that there is a tipping point beyond 
which the effect of this intersection declines. 
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What factors determine the success of social movements, and how do these factors 
operate? In this paper, I consider success in relation to the ideals that social movements 
follow and in connection with observable policy outcomes (see Giugni (1998) for a broader 
perspective on the outcomes of social movements). Because the outcomes of social 
movements occur as a result of accumulated influence (Tilly 1999), I assess the conditions 
under which movements achieve progress and the factors that accelerate or decelerate 
developments. 
It is widely accepted in the literature that an analysis of the political system is crucial 
to understand the policy outcomes of social movements. The institutional setting determines 
which actors in the political system constitute the political elite. In parliamentary 
democracies, the political elite is composed of the representatives of political parties – the 
central political organizations – in parliament. This elite passes laws and defines policy goals. 
Social movements attempt to influence this elite to achieve policy changes.  
I argue that activists in the political system are an effective means for social 
movements to achieve their goals in parliamentary democracies. Such activists are integrated 
into both networks and are therefore insiders of both the social movement and the parliament. 
Unlike other means of influence, such as public pressure or lobbying, this intersection is 
based upon trust. Activists in politics fight for the goals of their social movement even 
without extrinsic incentives, such as votes or nominations. Their advantageous position of 
being embedded within the network of the movement organization and that of their political 
party allows them to combine the resources of both networks. Furthermore, activists in 
politics can employ insider tactics that are unavailable to activists outside the political system. 
Nevertheless, the positioning of activists in politics has disadvantages. If there are too 
many such activists, the identity of the social movement can be endangered and mutual trust 
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undermined. Social movements emerge because the political system as a whole is regarded as 
unwilling or unable to properly address specific issues (Tilly 1999). Thus, the distance from 
political decision-makers constitutes the identity of a movement.1 If activists perceive the 
distance between the social movement and the political system as insufficient, they may 
induce conflict or separation to restore their identity. However, even if a social movement’s 
members accept embedded activists as a legitimate instrument with which to pursue goals, the 
members will always regard this arrangement with caution. Thus, activists in politics need to 
use some of their resources to balance the demands of the movement and those of the party 
(i.e., to maintain this role conflict at a controllable level). 
Given the broad range of possible examples, the German antinuclear movement is an 
excellent case study for a substantive empirical analysis. Its policy goal is clearly definable: 
nuclear phase-out. Therefore, every new nuclear reactor or delayed shutdown represents a 
setback, whereas every shutdown or prevented construction represents a success. In addition, 
the German political system is federalist and thus allows for the comparison of regions with 
varying degrees of success. Because of the similarities among regions, the same mechanisms 
are expected to be operative. Finally, the antinuclear movement in Germany has a long history 
that began in the 1970s; thus, information from several decades is available for analysis.  
To conduct the analysis, I collected information on Green Party members of 
parliament and their connections with the antinuclear movement from biographical material, 
archived party documents and parliamentary documents. The result is a set of novel microdata 
on the German antinuclear movement. Using this information, I calculated intersection based 
on the number of Green members of parliament with activist backgrounds in the antinuclear 
movement. Furthermore, I evaluated information from the International Atomic Energy 
                                                
1 See Polletta and Jasper (2001) for a broader discussion of the role of collective identity. Concerning new 
developments, Ackland and O'Neil (2011) provide insights on how organizations create identity using the 
internet. 
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Agency (IAEA) and the official journal of the interest group Deutsches Atomforum e.V. to 
define 15 episodes in seven of the federal states of Germany. These episodes represent the 
timespans until another nuclear power station went offline or plans to build a new station 
were abandoned. Important alternative explanations are also considered in my data and 
analysis. An event history analysis of these unique longitudinal data reveals that the effect of 
activists in politics operates in the expected direction. Controlling for public pressure and 
lobbying does not weaken this result. 
Political Influence of Social Movements 
There is an ongoing debate on how collective action influences policies (Burstein and 
Sausner 2005). Many researchers consider political parties, interest groups, social movements 
and public opinion to be the most important factors in policy-making (Burstein and Linton 
2002). Numerous aspects of how social movements influence policy outcomes remain unclear 
(Amenta et al. 2010). Although there are several contributions toward a better understanding 
of the specific mechanisms (e.g., Andrews (2001); Kolb (2007)), researchers agree that there 
is still work to be done (e.g., Viterna (2013)). In the current paper, I will contribute to this 
area of the literature.  
In the literature on policy outcomes, two prominent lines of reasoning emphasize the 
importance of the political system in understanding the success of social movements in 
influencing policy: political opportunity theory (Meyer and Minkoff 2004) and political 
mediation models (Amenta, Caren and Olasky 2005; Cress and Snow 2000). However, many 
different actors are involved in the political system, and a more precise understanding is 
necessary. Therefore, a focus on the most important decision-makers – the political elite – is 
helpful. Such a focus implies an understanding of the elite as a group of actors with dominant 
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or powerful positions (Khan 2012). The institutional setting largely defines which positions 
are powerful. For example, in parliamentary democracies, political parties’ representatives in 
parliament are the most powerful. These representatives vote on every important political 
decision and have access to classified government information. To achieve their goals, social 
movements must influence these representatives. 
One means of influencing these elites is public pressure. Public pressure encompasses 
all attempts to influence the political elite through the mass media.2 Recent studies have 
identified the conditions under which social movements are successful in media appearances 
(Amenta et al. 2009; Andrews and Caren 2010). In addition, analyses have been conducted to 
determine how protest and public opinion interact to influence policy-making (Agnone 2007; 
Olzak and Soule 2009). Although public pressure can be a powerful tool, social movements 
depend on the media for this indirect means of influence. 
A common approach to directly influence political elites is through lobbying.3 The aim 
of lobbying is to increase agreement between a social movement and elite actors (Burstein 
and Linton 2002). Lobbying can be an effective tool for connecting with indecisive actors and 
persuading them to support the movement’s goals. Lobbying is especially common among 
social movements with organizational structures that are managed by professionals (Andrews 
and Edwards 2005). However, the efficiency of lobbying depends on a constant and reliable 
flow of resources. Successful lobbying pursues mutual exchange in an instrumental manner. If 
a movement cannot provide public legitimation or support, then politicians have no reason to 
continue providing assistance. As a result, political elites will tend to sever connections or 
limit their support. From the perspective of social movements, the lack of control over such 
                                                
2 Another way to consider public pressure is to focus on social movements’ pressure on companies. For instance, 
Bartley and Child (2011) describe the effects of anti-sweatshop campaigns on U.S. companies. 
3 Following the classification of Hall and Deardorff (2006), I concentrated on exchange theories and lobbying as 
persuasion. 
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relationships represents a vulnerable influence and, therefore, instability. Similar to public 
pressure, lobbying may be the only available tool in certain instances and may be a useful 
supplement in others, but a social movement that is able to ensure support under poor 
circumstances will enjoy a better initial position than a movement that cannot. 
A discussion of connections beyond instrumental exchanges must include the 
consideration of alliances. Elite allies in politics are known to significantly improve a social 
movement’s chances of success (Soule and Olzak 2004) and are widely discussed in the 
literature (e.g., Giugni (2007)). For instance, Dixon and Martin (2012) describe how non-
union allies supported labor unions with both material and symbolic actions during strike 
events. There appears to be a consensus that political elite allies can significantly promote the 
goals of social movements. However, explanations of the underlying mechanisms are scarce. 
In this paper, I contribute to this neglected aspect of the discussion by developing a 
theoretical argument concerning how social movements create and maintain alliances with 
political elites on an individual level. Related to the concepts of ‘institutional activists’ 
developed by Santoro and McGuire (1997) and ‘insider tactics’, developed by Banaszak 
(2005), I demonstrate how the structural qualities of the interaction between the political 
system and a social movement and its micro-foundation can be combined in a social network 
framework. In the following section, I provide detailed arguments for why activists in politics 
are a strong and stable means of influencing policy decisions. 
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Activists in Politics 
Social network analysis and its concepts constitute an established approach to research 
on social movements. The ideas described in the previous section can be translated into a 
social network framework to emphasize both the positions of individual actors and their 
structural relationships. In this framework, the interactions among the news media, a social 
movement and a political party are conceptualized as connections between three different 
networks (see figure 1). Public pressure is an indirect connection between a social movement 
and a political party via the news media (1). A direct connection from a social movement to a 
political party indicates lobbying (2). Finally, intersection occurs if at least one actor is 
integrated into both networks as a full member (3). 
In contrast to ‘institutional activists’ (Santoro and McGuire 1997), the term 
‘intersection’ emphasizes structural quality rather than the attitudes of the actors. Although 
the basic notion is similar, a more structural perspective highlights the connections between a 
social movement and political parties. In other words, intersection emphasizes merging 
networks rather than individual decisions. This perspective corresponds to the notion that an 
important share of a social movement’s social capital is created by its ties to political elites 
(Diani 1997). In the terms of Evans and Kay (2008), the intersection I describe here is a 
specific case of field overlap. Following these authors, there are four mechanisms that result 
from of such network intersection, of which two are most important for my argument: 
‘alliance brokerage’ and ‘resource brokerage’. I will return to these notions when I describe 
the specific mechanisms of influence. 
It is important to note that intersection is generally not an available option. Only 
political actors who are already sympathizers can be included in a social movement’s 
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network. The ideological threshold for intersection is substantially higher than it is for 
successful lobbying, which can also target political actors from more distant parties. Actors 
must commit to a movement’s goal and adjust their identity. Thus, the existence of an allied 
political party is a necessary condition for the existence of intersection.4 Here, allies of social 
movements are political parties that share attitudes toward specific issues. For instance, only 
parties in favor of nuclear phase-out are (potential) allies of the antinuclear movement. 
Lacking such an ally, intersection is impossible. 
 
 
Figure 1: There are three ways in which social movements may influence policy: (1) creating public 
pressure on political parties via the media, (2) lobbying in favor of the movement’s goals and (3) 
intersection. The advantage of intersection is that the connection is more stable and stronger than public 
pressure and lobbying. 
 
 
                                                
4 As Minkoff (1997) indicates, political allies are also necessary to extend protest under certain conditions. 
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Where does an intersection with an allied political party originate? There are two 
possibilities: activists can join an existing party or participate in the creation of a new party. 
However, established parties have a history of negotiating their programs, at least in 
parliamentary democracies. New political trends are difficult to embed because they can 
disturb the unstable balance between existing political wings. A different situation occurs 
during the emergence of a new party, at which point no influential group of members exists 
and no program has been adopted. In other words, it is easier to introduce new ideas and 
propose emphases within an emerging party than within an existing one. Social movements in 
Germany exploited such opportunities when the Green Party was founded. From a social 
movement perspective, an ideal scenario occurs when a party emerges as a direct result of the 
social movement. Perhaps the most famous examples are the labor parties that emerged as a 
result of preexisting unions.  
Activists in politics can create and sustain trust, combine various resources and apply 
tactics that are unavailable to activists outside of the political system. Trust is the factor that 
most strongly differentiates an intersection from lobbying. Activists in politics are insiders of 
both networks and thus are closely connected to these networks. Other network members do 
not question the loyalty of these activists because they are perceived as ‘one of us’. This trust 
is justified because members of political parties with an activist background are firmly 
convinced of the movement’s goals. They do not ignore the interests of their social 
movement, even at the risk of losing votes. These members have intrinsic motivation to 
pursue their goals, notwithstanding absent or weak extrinsic incentives. 
If these central actors succeed in maintaining trust, then they enjoy a very strong 
brokerage position (see Stovel and Shaw (2012) for a review on brokers). Their advantageous 
position enables them to combine diverse resources (compare Evans and Kay (2008) and their 
notions of ‘alliance brokerage’ and ‘resource brokerage’). For example, parties can provide 
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valuable information on political processes while the social movement supplies support. Both 
resources affect policy on personal relationships at the micro level. Therefore, embedded 
activists have more opportunities to influence decisions and increase the likelihood and speed 
of their movement’s success. 
Opportunities to influence decisions are closely linked to what Banaszak (2005) calls 
‘insider tactics’. Activists in politics have insight into parliamentarian work that helps them to 
identify important procedures to use and actors to address inside the political system. 
Therefore, such activists expand the tactical repertoire of a social movement (Evans and Kay 
2008), which increases the probability of success (Olzak and Ryo 2007). Taking the 
antinuclear movement as an example, activists in parliament are aware of plans to construct 
new nuclear power plants earlier than activists outside of politics are. They can provide this 
information to antinuclear movements, allowing the movements to react more promptly than 
they could without this direct access. 
However, activists in politics – similar to other brokers – encounter serious 
difficulties. At least two role expectations accompany being embedded in two networks. It is 
difficult to simultaneously fulfill the roles of an activist and a politician, especially if role 
expectations are connected with identity. Consider, for instance, a person who begins to 
participate in a social movement. She already shares the movement’s goals, and she develops 
an identity as an activist by participating in meetings, demonstrations and other activities. As 
discussed by Zuckerman et al. (2003) in a study of the film labor market, the focused identity 
of the activist is both a result of and a prerequisite for becoming an accepted member of the 
movement. If she chooses to expand her activities to a political party, then an adjustment to 
another identity is necessary. As Viterna (2013) emphasizes in her theory on micro-level 
processes of mobilization, the identities of activists are both internally held and externally 
applied by others. That is, it is not enough if an activist maintains her identity while joining 
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politics; it is also necessary for her original movement to continue applying it to her. 
Otherwise, the additional role as a politician replaces her status as an activist. If tensions 
between both identities increase, then resources may be needed to ensure loyalty in both 
directions; otherwise, alienation between the movement and the party may be renewed. In 
both cases, fewer resources are available to pursue the movement’s goals. 
An example from my case of such a development is Petra Kelly, one of the most 
important Green politicians in Germany until her death in 1992. Petra Kelly became a 
member of the German antinuclear movement during the 1970s. Prior to this, she participated 
in initiatives supporting children with cancer, which led to a natural sympathy for the anti-
nuclear cause. However, soon after she became a member of parliament, local activists 
accused her of neglecting the movement’s cause in favor of more prestigious, i.e., 
international activities (Richter 2010). On a more abstract level, activists doubted whether a 
politician could remain one of their own. 
Alliances with political parties also involve risks at the macro level. The main risk 
arises through the institutionalization of protest.5 A driving force of social movements is their 
distance from the political establishment and their identity as a legitimate representative (Tilly 
1999). Activists may interpret substantial intersection with political parties as a reprehensible 
development and may react by inducing separation or open conflict to restore the distance 
between the movement and the political system. Furthermore, public perception may change. 
Whereas excessive lobbying casts doubt on the independence of political decision-making, 
excessive intersection subverts the legitimation of the social movement. 
                                                
5 A less important risk for my analysis is that political parties can exploit social movements. One example is the 
case study of Ho (2003) regarding the antinuclear movement in Taiwan. Here, the antinuclear activists were 
forced into the role of campaigners for the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Only a strong DPP could urge 
antinuclear policies, and the antinuclear movement had no alternative available. 
 79 
Meyer (1993) provides an example of how institutionalization carries the risk of losing 
credibility and reduces opportunities for powerful alliances. His study reveals how certain 
activists in the Nuclear Freeze Movement in the United States introduced moderate goals and 
targeted their efforts at Congress rather than the broader public. The movement’s majority 
perceived this shift in politics as a retreat and thus distanced itself from the movement. The 
remaining resources were not sufficient to achieve the moderate goals or any other 
substantive goals of the movement. 
Given the advantages and disadvantages of activists in politics, a subsequent question 
arises: what degree of intersection between a social movement and the political system creates 
the most influence? As the structural intersection increases, actors are better able to use their 
specific connections within the party to reinforce their position with mutual support. In 
addition, as the number of connections increases, both the diversity of tactics and the amount 
of resources increase. However, institutionalization and closeness to the political system 
operate in the opposite direction. The effects are stronger in the presence of greater 
intersection because other activists’ tolerance of alliances decreases. 
The primary hypothesis derived from the theoretical argument is that intersection and 
policy outcomes should interact in the form of an inverted U-shaped relationship. This 
conclusion relates to the question previous asked in the literature, namely, whether there 
might be a threshold for the positive impact of network intersection (Evans and Kay 2008). I 
test this hypothesis using the example of the German antinuclear movement and its 
intersection with the Greens over a period of three decades. Before I describe the data 
collection, operationalization and statistical model, I provide background information on both 
the movement and the Green Party. 
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Case Selection and Historical Background 
There are several reasons to choose the German antinuclear movement as an example 
for the empirical analysis. First, the antinuclear movement is a worldwide phenomenon. 
However, its national branches differ largely in their political impact. The German antinuclear 
movement is the most succesful movement of this type and provides a good case to explain 
variations in success over time. Second, the political goals of antinuclear movements are 
closely linked to the economic structure. This is especially true for Germany, where the 
official end of nuclear energy production has led to many adjustments by the energy sector 
and connected industries. Third, the grassroots structure of the German antinuclear movement 
makes it comparable to many other social movements in various policy arenas and contexts, 
which increases the generalizability of the results.  
In addition, there are three more technical reasons for this case selection. First, the 
antinuclear movement’s issue is clearly definable, which facilitates the empirical analysis. 
The second reason for this choice lies in the federalist structure of Germany. Germany’s 
regions are similar in terms of the regional political structure and their position within the 
nationwide context. Consequently, unobserved heterogeneity across German regions is less 
likely than it is between different countries. A comparison of similar regions that vary in the 
number of antinuclear successes facilitates causal inferences. Third, the antinuclear movement 
in Germany has existed for three decades, which provides sufficient data to conduct a reliable 
analysis. 
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The German Antinuclear Movement 
The antinuclear movement was only one aspect of broader development that occurred 
in Germany during the 1970s. United in their opposition to the political system, various 
movements and political groups shaped public debates regarding such issues as women's 
rights, peace and environmental protection. Similar to other movements during this period, 
the antinuclear movement was not hesitant in its choice of methods. Between 1970 and 1997, 
11.3 percent of antinuclear demonstrations in Germany included violence, and 26.2 percent 
were considered confrontational. For instance, a demonstration of 28,000 participants in Whyl 
led to the occupation of a construction site (Rucht 2008). Another characteristic of antinuclear 
protests in Germany is the substantial variation in the number of participants. The incidents at 
Harrisburg (1979), Chernobyl (1986) and Tomsk (1993) amplified mobilization, but between 
these incidents, protests diminished sharply (see figure 2). The Greens joined the federal 
government in 1998. According to Poloni-Staudinger (2009), concentration on political 
alliances explains the subsequent lack of mobilization. 
In 2000, the antinuclear movement celebrated a major success when the coalition of 
Social Democrats and Greens announced the nuclear phase-out. A temporary change of 
course was introduced by the conservative-liberal coalition in 2010 but was then canceled 
only one year later in 2011 immediately following the earthquake in Japan that led to serious 
damage to a nuclear reactor in Fukushima. Although not yet definitive, the antinuclear 
movement in Germany appears to have finally succeeded in its struggle after approximately 
40 years of existence. 
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Figure 2: The number of demonstrators is summed for each year over all regions using the PRODAT 
dataset. The peaks in 1979, 1986 and 1993 are connected to the incidents in Harrisburg, Chernobyl and 
Tomsk, respectively. 
 
Local action groups and informal networks characterize the internal structure of the 
antinuclear movement (Rucht 2008). Initially, the Bundesverband Bürgerinitiativen 
Umweltschutz (BBU) (Federal Alliance of Citizens' Initiatives for Environmental Protection) 
played an important role in the movement (see Markham (2005) for details). The goal of the 
alliance was to unite disparate branches of environmental movement organizations, such as 
initiatives against water pollution, highway construction and nuclear energy. However, this 
alliance was unstable because the direction and scope of the aims within the BBU 
fundamentally differed from those of the movements. New and more successful competitors 
entered the scene, such as Bund Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland (BUND) (German 
League for Environment and Nature Protection) in 1975, Greenpeace Germany in 1980 and 
Robin Wood in 1982. Most important, however, was the foundation of the Greens. The 
formation of this party had a lasting effect on the German political system. 
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The Green Party 
The foundation of the Green Party of Germany in 1980 was a reorganization of 
existing political lists. 6  These lists emerged from 1977 onward and emphasized either 
ecological or leftist political agendas. One ecological list successfully participated in regional 
elections in Bremen in 1979, marking the beginning of a series of electoral successes at the 
regional level. In 1983, the Greens entered the Bundestag (German Parliament). Throughout 
the 1980s, the Greens were involved in heated discussions concerning their future political 
orientation. Two wings, the ‘fundamentalists’ and the ‘realists’, bitterly contested how leftist 
the Greens should be, including issues such as whether a coalition with the Christian 
Democrats should be a (theoretical) option. In the midst of internal struggles, the Greens lost 
the first national elections after reunification in 1990 and failed to reach the necessary 5 
percent voter threshold in West Germany. The party slowly recovered, and in 1998, it formed 
a coalition with the Social Democrats to form the federal government until 2005. As 
previously noted, the coalition finalized negotiations with energy producers and announced 
the nuclear phase-out in 2000. 
Connections between the Greens and social movements played an important role from 
the party’s formation. The Greens wished to be a party of movements while cherishing their 
independence. One means of support was financial contributions, but only the women's rights, 
peace and third world movements actively participated in negotiations. The antinuclear 
movement opted to maintain its distance from the political system and emphasized its 
independence. Nevertheless, antinuclear objectives were a vital component of the Green 
Party's political agenda, particularly during the periods in which the antinuclear movement 
was unable to mobilize a large number of demonstrators. The movement and the party 
                                                
6 My brief summary is based on the book of Raschke and Heinrich (1993). 
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maintained their connections but did not institutionalize an intersection. Rather, activists 
throughout Germany joined the Greens and fought for antinuclear issues as party members. 
Some of these activists joined regional parliaments and the Bundestag. These actors represent 
intersection in the following analysis. 
Although there have always been connections between the Greens and the antinuclear 
movement, the relationship has been a complicated one. A good example of the general 
dynamics is Johnsen’s (1988) description of the 1982-1985 period in Hesse. During this 
period, the balance of power within the Greens changed, and with it changed the party’s 
distance to the antinuclear movement. Whereas the ‘fundamentalists’ were in favor of an 
absolute opposition, the ‘realists’ started to work toward a possible coalition with the Social 
Democrats. In 1983, the Greens agreed to tolerate a minority government in exchange for 
preserving the status quo concerning nuclear energy production. When the Greens withdrew 
their support in 1984, they returned to absolute demands, namely an early shut down of the 
existing power plants. In 1985, the Greens became part of the regional government and 
Joschka Fischer, later foreign minister of Germany, became the first Green minister. During 
these years, the distance between the antinuclear movement and the party increased every 
time the Greens came closer to the government and decreased when they emphasized their 
oppositional role. This pattern is in line with the argument that social movements attempt to 
keep their distance from the political system.  
The Role of Regional Parliaments 
The construction and operation of a nuclear power plant in Germany constituted a 
complex business endeavor. The following summary of the formal process is based on 
Ronellenfitsch (1983). First, a prospective operator began informal discussions with the 
responsible administration at the regional level concerning a possible new power plant. Most 
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importantly, he described what type of reactor he wished to construct and where. These talks 
continued until an agreement was reached or the potential operator halted the talks. Second, 
the company submitted a formal application. The regional and national authorities considered 
this application and made it public. Over several months, the parties concerned could examine 
the files and submit concerns or protests. Third, the regional administration decided whether 
to dismiss or accept the application. In addition, these applications had to be renewed at 
regular intervals. 
Most important for the research question of this paper, the main decisions were made 
at the regional level. Although the national authorities were involved, the regional 
government had the final word, for instance, concerning the exact location (e.g., Kretschmer 
and Rucht (1991)). The political discussion, however, occurred in the parliaments 
(Ronellenfitsch 1983). Here, the opposition had several instruments to influence the process. 
First, members of parliament could use a so-called ‘Kleine Anfrage’ (brief enquiry) to ask the 
government whether there were informal discussions on new power plants. If the answer was 
yes, the antinuclear movement could begin to mobilize one stage earlier in the process than 
would have been the case had they needed to wait for the official application. Second, 
members of parliament, especially those in relevant committees, could contact officials in the 
respective administrations to obtain information on the ongoing process and optimal ways to 
delay or end it. 
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Data Collection and Operationalization 
Success 
The external success of social movements has been widely discussed in the literature, 
and very different approaches have been proposed to measure and understand this success. 
Related concepts range from a focus on enacted laws to broad understandings that include 
indirect and unintended consequences (Giugni 1998). Because the theoretical argument 
concerns political actors, I focus on policy outcomes. In addition, I adopt an understanding of 
success as a gradual process rather than an all-or-nothing approach (e.g., Yamasaki (2009)). 
By tracing single steps, it is possible to disaggregate long-term developments into shorter time 
periods that are comparable and thus yield more precise information. 
The antinuclear movement strives for a world without nuclear energy production. 
Therefore, the movement considers every prevented construction or shutdown of a nuclear 
reactor to be a policy decision in the right direction. In other words, every project to construct 
a new nuclear power station and every online reactor are obstacles on the antinuclear 
movement’s path to success. 
From a contemporary perspective, we know that the German antinuclear movement 
was highly successful. Therefore, it is not interesting to consider whether a higher intersection 
increased the likelihood of success itself. Instead, the intersection should have affected the 
rate of progress. The more important an individual factor was for the success of the 
antinuclear movement, the more rapid subsequent steps toward success should have been. 
Another important aspect is the level of analysis. As described above, the most important 
decision-makers concerning nuclear power stations were the regional governments and 
parliaments. 
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To avoid bias, it is important to define the risk population of the analysis. The risk 
population denotes the segment of the general population that might experience an event. In 
this case, the antinuclear movement could only go one step further if there were a nuclear 
power station or a plan to construct one. Including a region in the analysis that lacked such an 
opportunity would confuse the lack of potential success with a missed goal. Of course, all 
regions might have been constantly at risk of constructing a new plant. However, in these 
cases, it is not possible to distinguish success from a lack of success without access to 
substantially more information on internal decision processes. 
Regions were entered into the analysis when the first antinuclear demonstration 
occurred. Clearly, some type of formal or informal structure had evolved before this. 
However, it is difficult to quantitatively justify how and, above all, when unobservable 
structures influence political decisions. In contrast, the first demonstrations clearly signal a 
social movement's willingness to begin participating in public debates. Only subsequent 
successes can be linked to the movement's efforts. Regions were removed from the dataset in 
2002 or in instances in which no (planned) nuclear reactors remained. Time steps were 
measured in months. Different times of entry and exit resulted in 115 to 364 months or 
approximately 10 to 30 years of observation between 1972 and 2002. The following analysis 
refers to 2,023 clustered data points. 
For practical reasons, only facilities with a clear commercial background were 
included in the dataset. Nuclear reactors for scientific purposes and related infrastructure, 
especially waste deposal sites, were excluded (see Sherman (2011) for details regarding the 
complex interactions in these cases). After the application of these restrictions, seven out of 
16 German regions remained in the risk population. 
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I collected data from two different sources to operationalize success. The IAEA 
provides online information on all 30 nuclear power stations that were in operation in 
Germany. Eleven of these stations went offline before 2002 and were therefore considered 
successes. I used the official journal of the interest group Deutsches Atomforum e.V. as the 
second data source. This journal includes an annual report on the state of nuclear energy in 
Germany. I found information on eight projects that were planned but never fully realized. 
These projects were considered successes. Including the 11 shutdowns, 19 successes occurred 
between 1972 and 2002. However, the number of episodes was lower. One event in 
Rhineland-Palatinate and two events in Bavaria occurred before the antinuclear movement’s 
demonstrations began. Two projects in Hesse were canceled in the same month, resulting in 
only one event. Thus, 15 episodes were entered into the analysis.  
Intersection of Social Movement and Political Parties 
Intersection measures the number of activists in politics. In the current case, 
intersection implies the number of antinuclear activists in regional and national parliaments. 
This operationalization does not include activists and politicians in general. Although this 
approach prevents a more general view of the specific mechanism, it is a direct measurement 
of the theoretical argument. Only the political elite has direct access to the influence the 
antinuclear movement is seeking. I argue that the existence of intersection relies on an allied 
political party. In the empirical case investigated here, only the Greens are applicable. Other 
parties, especially the Social Democrats (SPD), changed their views concerning nuclear 
energy production; thus, only the Greens were a reliable ally for the entire period. 
To construct intersection, I collected the names of all 352 Green members of 
parliament and the periods during which they served in office at the regional and national 
levels from official lists and reports of the electoral authorities. The number of actors 
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multiplied by their individual periods in office created 21,738 observations. In the next step, I 
accounted for the following three types of sources to identify antinuclear activists: 
biographical material, party documents and parliamentary documents (see table 1). 
 
Assignment 
Biography 
Party Parliament 
N 
Activists Missing 
based on Documents Documents (%) (%) 
BW 40 21 . 61 7 (11.5) 10 (14.1) 
BY 54 . . 54 10 (18.5) . 
HE 26 13 11 50 9 (18.0) 5 (9.1) 
NI 48 5 6 59 18 (30.5) 1 (1.7) 
NW 45 18 4 67 4 (6.0) 8 (10.7) 
RP 9 2 10 21 5 (23.8) . 
SH 15 1 . 16 4 (25.0) . 
Total 
N 237 60 31 328 57 (17.4) 24 (6.8) 
% 72.3 18.3 9.4 100   
 
Table 1: Data sources for intersection. The regions are Baden-Wuerttemberg (BW), Bavaria (BY), Hesse 
(HE), Lower Saxony (NI), North Rhine-Westphalia (NW), Rheinland-Palatinate (RP) and Schleswig-
Holstein (SH). A total of 328 out of 352 actors are identified as either antinuclear activists or non-activists, 
corresponding to 93.2 percent of the statistical population. 
 
Biographies are the most reliable source; thus, I evaluated them first. I referred to the 
books of Lengemann (1986) (nine actors), Simon (1996) (25 actors) and Vierhaus (2002) (120 
actors) and information provided by parliaments (52 actors). In 31 additional cases, I 
evaluated the homepages of the representatives or their associates. Only actors with clearly 
observable membership or active participation in the antinuclear movement were considered 
activists. For instance, actors who explicitly joined the Greens because of Chernobyl were 
regarded as activists. Overall, I identified biographical material on 237 out of 352 actors, 
which corresponds to 67.3 percent of all actors. 
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Regarding the second type of source, I used historical documents from the Green 
regional associations obtained from the archive Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis in Berlin. The 
party-linked Hans-Böckler Foundation maintains the archive. This foundation collects 
documents created by the party and social movements in Germany to make them accessible to 
the general public. I used the register to identify documents that were clearly linked to 
individual parliamentarian actors and evaluated them with respect to their thematic emphasis. 
Sixty additional actors (another 17 percent) were identified. Table 1 provides an overview of 
the actors’ regional distribution. 
Finally, I used information regarding parliamentary questions. In the German political 
system, such questions serve as an instrument for individual members of parliament to obtain 
access to government information. According to the theoretical question of the current paper, 
antinuclear activists should exhibit noticeable engagement in the antinuclear topic. Thirty-one 
actors (8.8 percent) were positively classified (again, see table 1 for details). 
In summary, 328 of 352 relevant actors were captured by the data, corresponding to 
93.2 percent. Given the number of observations, the coverage is even higher. A total of 
21,292 of 21,738 data points (97.7 percent) were available for analysis. I classified 17.4 
percent of them as activists. The Greens integrated a broad range of movements; therefore, 
this number appears reasonable. It is important to emphasize that I only considered politicians 
activists if they were activists before they became members of parliament. Otherwise, the 
measurement would not capture activists in politics but politicians in social movements. The 
latter is outside the scope of this paper.  
To eliminate the possibility of bias caused by the underlying sources, I compared the 
sources with respect to the proportion of activists. Among the 237 actors identified via 
biographical material, 44 (18.6 percent) were classified as antinuclear activists. I evaluated 
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party documents for another 60 actors, and 11 of them (18.3 percent) were considered 
activists. The proportion in the third group (parliamentary documents) differed significantly: 
only two of 31 actors (6.5 percent) were considered antinuclear activists. This deviation 
results from the hierarchy of sources rather than bias. Only actors who did not appear in 
biographies or party documents remained in the third step. Therefore, the probability of 
identifying missing activists in this step was relatively low. For the same reason, it is unlikely 
that unidentified actors were activists, although this assertion cannot be verified.7 
Given the information regarding the actors, intersection with the Greens was 
calculated as the proportion of antinuclear activists for each month and region and is plotted 
in figure 3. Rhineland-Palatinate and Schleswig-Holstein reached values of up to 100 percent 
because of the low number of Green members of parliament in these regions relative to the 
other five regions. There are few values above 50 percent, which I will address below in the 
interpretation section. Apart from this pattern, the variance within regions was high; thus, 
intersection was not regionally stable. Furthermore, the values indicated unequal patterns 
between regions, indicating that general developments at a higher level have no systematic 
influence on regional levels of intersection. In addition to the graphical overview, table 2 
includes descriptive information on the intersection and all other variables examined in this 
paper. All of these independent variables have substantive variation. 
                                                
7 My procedure might overestimate the overlap. Therefore, I recalculated all following models under the 
assumption that missing data indicated non-activists. However, there were only slight differences between the 
two models. If the amount of overlap were overestimated, then its effect would be underestimated. Thus, all 
conclusions in the main text are based on the more conservative estimations. 
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Figure 3: The degree of intersection for each region from January 1970 to December 2002. 
 
 
 Mean (Proportion) SD Min Max 
Intersection (%) 17.172 21.897 0 100 
Budget Greenpeace Germany (/million) 18.364 15.999 0 38.889 
Demonstrators (/1,000) 1.102 8.989 0 289 
Media Coverage 0.728 3.104 0 60 
Articles on Front Page 0.184    
Number of Activists in Parliament 1.635 2.051 0 8 
Share of Seats (%) 4.165 4.007 0 12.258 
Post-Chernobyl Period 0.560    
Number of Nuclear Projects/Power Plants 4.114 1.572 1 8 
 N = 2023 
 
Table 2: Distribution of variables. The data sources for all variables are described in the text. Media 
coverage is measured as the number of articles concerning one demonstration. The proportion of articles 
on the front page excludes observations without articles. 
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Combining all variables, the data structure used for the analysis is schematically 
presented in table 3. Each row includes the information for one region in one month during 
the observation window. The first episode concludes when the variable of success changes to 
one. The same is true for subsequent episodes. 
 
Region Month Year Perc. Intersection … Success 
BW June 1984 23.08% … 0 
BW July 1984 23.08% … 0 
… … … … … … 
BW Aug 1991 11.11% … 1 
 
Table 3: Data Structure. A schematic data structure was used for the analysis. Each time success changes 
from zero to one, an episode is over and another one begins. 
 
Statistical Analysis 
Model 
As mentioned above, the aspect of timing is crucial for understanding success. For 
instance, social movements initiate demonstrations that do not instantaneously induce change. 
Only a longitudinal perspective allows for an estimation of their true influence. If 
demonstrations (or other actions) accelerate the process, then the results should follow 
rapidly. In other words, a more effective tool of influence should lead to more rapid policy 
change than a less effective tool. I modeled this acceleration of events using event history 
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analysis with a parametric approach.8 Event history analysis models estimate the time until an 
event occurs based on covariates !! and a base hazard ℎ! ! : 
ℎ !|!! = ℎ! ! !"# !!!! . 
Parametric specifications, in contrast to semi-parametric models, explicitly define the 
base hazard ℎ! ! . I use a Gompertz distribution as the base hazard: 
ℎ! ! = !"# !" !"# !!  
In its initial applications, this distribution modeled mortality data and is therefore a 
useful approximation for technical devices such as nuclear reactors. Its use implies the 
assumption that the closure of a nuclear power station becomes increasingly likely as time 
advances, for instance because the costs to maintain a technical device’s operation increase 
with age.9  
I argue that intersection and the success of a movement should exhibit an inverted U-
shaped relationship. Consistently, the model includes a linear term and a quadratic term. The 
linear term should take a positive sign and the quadratic term a negative sign. In addition, a 
time-varying coefficient for intersection captures a possible long-term effect. If a hidden 
process alters the effect of intersection over the period of interest, then the estimated 
coefficient should be significant. 
                                                
8 See Jung (2010) for an extended discussion of why event history analysis is the preferable approach when 
analyzing data on social movements. 
9 I repeated the analysis with different base hazards, resulting in three main findings. First, although the 
amount of influence varied, the effect of overlap was robust against other specifications. Second, the effect 
of Chernobyl was also largely robust. Third, the Gompertz model was the most efficient parametric model 
as measured by the BIC. 
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The theoretical argument partly relies on resource allocation within and between the 
social movement and the political party. Mutual support can reinforce each actor's position 
within parliamentary groups. Therefore, absolute numbers of activists in parliament may be 
more important than the proportion of activists within the parliamentary group. Another 
possible source of bias is the relative strength of the Greens in parliament. However, electoral 
results do not equally translate into seats in parliament across regions and are therefore not a 
valid measure. Instead, I calculated the proportions of seats to capture the effect. 
As previously described, regions exited the dataset when no active reactor or ongoing 
project remained. However, with more than one target available, the time that elapsed before 
a policy change could differ. Each reactor might create an additional opportunity for protest 
because an increasing number of individuals are directly affected. Additional reactors might 
also complicate concentrated action because of the different priorities of local action groups. 
Either possibility could bias the estimated effect of intersection. Therefore, I included a count 
of targets in the model. The number of active reactors and ongoing projects also indicates how 
strongly a region is oriented toward the production of nuclear energy.10 
The potential danger of nuclear energy production is a pivotal argument of antinuclear 
movements. Core meltdowns lead to radioactive contamination, resulting in uninhabitable 
areas and a sharp increase in the risk of cancer and other diseases. The Chernobyl catastrophe 
in 1986 was interpreted as evidence that meltdowns are possible and that their consequences 
are terrifying (Koopmans and Duyvendak 1995).11 Although different countries have drawn 
starkly different conclusions from this incident (Kolb 2007), Chernobyl subsequently served 
as an important reference point in public discussions regarding nuclear energy production. If 
                                                
10 To the best of my knowledge, there is no available information on the different sources of energy production 
at the regional level for the relevant period. 
11 Antinuclear movements in Europe and the United States differ in this aspect. For the latter, Harrisburg in 1979 
was more important because of its local reference (Jasper and Poulsen 1995). 
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Chernobyl raised public awareness concerning the dangers of nuclear energy, then the amount 
of time that elapses before a policy change should be significantly shortened after the 
incident. 
The complete specification of the model is 
ℎ !|!! = !"# !" !"# !! + !!!! , 
with 
!!!! = !"#$%&$'#!(" ∙ !! + !"#$%&$'#!("! ∙ !! + !"#$%&$'#!(" ∙ ! ∙ !! 
+!"#$%$&#& ∙ !! + !"#$! ∙ !! + !ℎ!"#$%&' ∙ !! + !"#$%& ∙ !!. 
The Effect of Intersection 
Table 4 reports the estimated hazard ratios (HRs) of two models. HRs greater than one 
are positive effects, and HRs less than one are negative effects. The first model in table 4 is 
the model described above. The second model provides a benchmark to assess the relevance 
and efficiency of intersection. Because there is no statistical measure of explained variance in 
event history analysis, I calculated the Bayesian information criterion (BIC).12 A lower BIC 
indicates a more efficient model and greater explanatory power. 
Both the significance and direction of the linear and quadratic terms support the 
expected inverted U-shaped relationship between intersection and influence. Although the 
linear effect is clearly positive (HR: 1.230), the quadratic term indicates the existence of a 
threshold (HR: 0.997). The estimates of the time-varying coefficient reveal that the effect of 
                                                
12 Following the suggestion of Raftery (1995) regarding the use of BIC in event history analysis, I defined ! as 
the number of events. 
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intersection decreased slightly over the period analyzed (HR: 0.999). Although the effect is 
significant, it is too close to one to be interpreted as substantial. 
 Intersection Controls only 
Intersection (%) 1.230***  
 (1.113-1.360)  
Intersection Squared (%) 0.997*  
 (0.995-0.999)  
Time-Varying Coefficient Intersection 0.999*  
 (0.998-1.000)  
Number of Activists in Parliament 0.767 0.695 
 (0.423-1.389) (0.398-1.124) 
Share of Seats (%) 1.013 1.088 
 (0.858-1.197) (0.865-1.369) 
Post-Chernobyl Period 25.548** 30.103** 
 (3.389-192.580) (1.790-506.226) 
Number of Nuclear Projects/Power Plants 1.239 1.282 
 (0.870-1.766) (0.911-1.805) 
BIC 42.615 48.539 
*** p<0.001 ** p<0.01 *p<0.05 
 
Table 4: Time to shutdown – main models. Both models assume a Gompertz distribution; the results are 
reported as hazard ratios (HRs) with their 95 percent confidence intervals in parentheses below. The 
second model is calculated as a benchmark for estimating the importance of intersection. The lower BIC 
of the first model indicates that the inclusion of intersection in the model is efficient. The two most 
important findings are that there is a significant influence of intersection on success and that Chernobyl 
changed the subsequent rules. 
 
To provide empirical conclusions, I calculated the predicted hazards for all 
combinations of values in the dataset and sorted them according to the degree of intersection. 
In addition, I calculated a simplified function with only the linear and quadratic terms.13 
Figure 4 illustrates the results. The interpretation (and the graph) was limited to values of up 
to 50 percent because there were few observations with higher values. Nevertheless, there was 
                                                
13 ! ! = 0.207123! − 0.0025305!! 
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a predicted threshold at an intersection of 28.57 percent, and the threshold of the simplified 
function was approximately 40.93 percent. However, the exact values must be interpreted 
with caution. Missing observations with higher values of intersection could bias the 
estimation. Although the precise threshold cannot be estimated, there is clear evidence of its 
existence, and 30-40 percent is a reasonable approximation. 
How important is the degree of intersection in explaining policy outcomes? If 
intersection is irrelevant, then the second model should be more efficient because it includes 
fewer predictors. However, the BIC value of the first model was clearly lower (42.615 and 
48.539), indicating that intersection is an important aspect of the success of the antinuclear 
movement. 
 
Figure 4: Predicted hazards are based on the estimations of the first model (see table 4) and are 
subsequently ordered by the degree of intersection. Only observations with an intersection of 50 percent 
or less are shown because there are few observations with higher values. The dashed curve is calculated 
using the linear and quadratic coefficients for intersection (see the text for details). Predicted hazards 
have a visible threshold at 28.57 percent, and the threshold of the simplified function is approximately 
40.93 percent. Although the exact locations are not interpretable, they describe a reasonable range. 
Predicted hazards and the simplified function differ because of the opposing influences of other variables 
in the model. 
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Furthermore, the analysis provides evidence that the Chernobyl nuclear catastrophe 
marked a shift in nuclear policies (HR: 25.548 and 30.103). Kolb (2007) argues that 
Chernobyl led to complex interactions among the social movement, public opinion and 
political actors. Following his line of reasoning, Chernobyl triggered a fundamental shift in 
political opportunities. Depending on the movement's strength and the institutional setting, 
nuclear policies changed. My analysis confirms the overall connection between Chernobyl 
and subsequent decisions related to nuclear energy production; however, the confidence 
interval is wide, and the actual degree of this effect is thus unreliable.  
Controlling for other Mechanisms of Influence 
The estimations clearly revealed that intersection affected the success of the social 
movement. However, the other two means of influence mentioned above might also have 
influenced policy outcomes. Therefore, I estimated models for lobbying and public pressure 
and compared their results with those of the previous model. Table 5 contains all models and 
estimations. 
Lobbying 
The first alternative mechanism of influence of the social movement is lobbying. The 
literature includes two propositions regarding how to include lobbying in statistical models. 
Studies on political decisions in the United States refer to published amounts of money that 
were spent during elections and other campaigns (e.g., Baldwin and Magee (2000); Wawro 
(2001); Wright (1990)). Interest groups control so-called political action committees that are 
allowed to contribute. Conducting a survey is an alternative means of collecting necessary 
data (e.g., Andrews and Edwards (2005)). Because there are no comparable data for Germany, 
I contacted the three most important environmental organizations and requested their budgets. 
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Robin Wood and BUND were unable to provide financial reports, but Greenpeace Germany 
provided the requested information. Thus, I used the figures (in millions) from Greenpeace 
Germany to include a proxy variable for lobbying effects. 
In contrast to intersection, lobbying had no significant effect on the shutdown or 
prevention of the construction of nuclear power stations in Germany. However, the absence of 
an effect should not be interpreted as a general disproof of the influence of lobbying on 
politics. The absence of an effect in this model is likely due to the rough proxy. Although 
Greenpeace’s budget measures the overall development of organizations’ resources in this 
field, there is no information on what share of these resources was actually used for lobbying. 
Nevertheless, the results contribute evidence that the effect of intersection survives robustness 
checks. 
 
  
Lobbying 
Public Lobbying and Complete 
 Pressure Public Pressure Model 
Intersection (%)    1.246*** 
Intersection Squared (%)    0.997* 
Time-Varying Coefficient Intersection    0.999** 
Budget Greenpeace Germany (/million €) 0.990  0.987 1.009 
Demonstrators (/1,000)  1.002 1.002 1.004 
Media Coverage  0.813 0.809 0.795 
Article on Front Page  2.600 2.522 3.143 
Number of Activists in Parliament 0.691 0.709 0.703 0.772 
Share of Seats (%) 1.092 1.081 1.087 1.001 
Post-Chernobyl Period 32.402* 29.570* 32.817* 23.878* 
Number of Nuclear Projects/Power Plants 1.269 1.286 1.269 1.264 
BIC 48.503 47.334 47.274 41.010 
*** p<0.001 ** p<0.01 * p<0.05 
 
Table 5: Time to shutdown – alternative explanations. Again, all four models assume a Gompertz distribution. The results are reported as hazard ratios (HRs). The 
effects of public pressure and lobbying are not significant in any model configuration. All three models without intersection are also less efficient. Their BIC values 
(47.274-48.503) are higher than the values for both the complete model (41.010) and the model that included intersection only (42.615).  
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Public Pressure 
Public pressure via the mass media is the second alternative means by which social 
movements influence policy outcomes. Demonstrations have the characteristics of 
newsworthy events, known as news factors in the literature (Kepplinger and Ehmig 2006). 
Media coverage creates pressure because decision-makers in general and politicians in 
particular pay attention to their publicity. In the case of politicians, bad publicity endangers 
their probability of winning elections. Higher rates of mobilization should lead to a greater 
amount of media coverage, which, in turn, should increase pressure on public figures and the 
likelihood of rapid achievements. I controlled for both mobilization and media coverage by 
referring to PRODAT, a dataset collected by the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für 
Sozialforschung (WZB) concerning protest events in Germany between 1950 and 2002. 
PRODAT relies on two newspapers: the Süddeutsche Zeitung and the Frankfurter Rundschau. 
Although both newspapers are distributed nationwide, their head offices are located in 
Munich (Bavaria) and Frankfurt (Hesse). Therefore, demonstration events in these two 
regions might be overreported. Nevertheless, PRODAT is the best dataset available to include 
public pressure in the model. Mobilization was operationalized as the number of 
demonstrators per month and region, divided by 1,000.14 
Media coverage was calculated as the number of articles pertaining to each 
demonstration at the regional level. A greater number of articles indicates both a longer 
period of media coverage and more extensive reporting. I also included a dummy in the model 
to account for front-page coverage. Prominently placed reports on antinuclear demonstrations 
could have a greater effect than less noticeable reports. 
                                                
14 Counting the number of events instead of the number of demonstrators is an alternative measurement of public 
pressure. However, estimations do not change substantively and variation in protest size is much higher in the 
PRODAT dataset than the number of events. 
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The results indicated that public pressure did not have a significant influence on the 
success of the antinuclear movement in Germany. Neither the number of demonstrators nor 
the amount of media coverage or front-page coverage was a decisive factor. One possible 
explanation is that political actors only react to new information on the opinions of their 
electorate and that demonstrations lose their influence over time (see Burstein and Linton 
(2002) for a summary and Lohmann (1993) for details). However, a meta-analysis by Uba 
(2009) suggests that public opinion has no significant effect on policies. An investigation of 
how mobilization affected the German antinuclear movement’s presence in the media is 
beyond the scope of this paper but certainly warrants a detailed analysis. A recent study by 
Malinick, Tindall and Diani (2013) demonstrates that such an analysis should be based on a 
decomposition of the movement into its activists’ respective positions. The most important 
point is that the effects of intersection remain robust regardless of the model specification. 
Comparison and Summary 
Table 4 provides evidence on the influence of intersection. Table 5 complements these 
results with a comparison of other possible mechanisms, namely lobbying and public 
pressure. There was no model configuration in which lobbying or public pressure had a 
significant effect on the time until a success occurred for the antinuclear movement. Again, I 
calculated the BIC to compare efficiency. Although the estimators of both alternative 
mechanisms were non-significant, their inclusion in the model increased efficiency. 
In summary, the results suggest that intersection is an important mechanism with 
respect to a social movement's influence on policy outcomes. Alternative mechanisms did not 
contradict this result; in fact, they strengthened the argument regarding activists in politics 
because the significance remained stable when additional variables were considered. 
Furthermore, the findings reveal that the Chernobyl catastrophe was a watershed event; the 
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estimations clearly indicate that policy change was more likely following the catastrophe than 
before the event. 
Conclusion 
The initial question asked in this paper was how social movements effectively 
influence policy outcomes. I argued that an intersection of a social movement and a political 
party is a stable and strong instrument of influence because these activists in politics use trust 
to combine resources and apply additional tactics. Furthermore, I described how this 
intersection loses some of its influence if it becomes excessively large because role conflicts 
occur and trust becomes mistrust. Therefore, policy outcomes and intersection should exhibit 
an inverted U-shaped relationship. 
Despite certain data limitations, the event history analysis provided clear evidence that 
intersection affects policy outcomes. Alternative mechanisms and varying model 
specifications did not weaken this effect. Caution is required in the interpretation of the 
threshold. However, I wish to emphasize that although the results indicate its existence, only 
application to other empirical settings can yield more precise information on the influence of 
intersection. For instance, Uba (2009) demonstrates that the legitimacy, stability and types of 
regimes are important factors in evaluating the influence of social movements on policy 
outcomes. For instance, a presidential democracy and a parliamentary democracy may follow 
different rules because of differing levels of access to political decisions (e.g., Burstein and 
Hirsh (2007)). 
This application to another political system is one way to further investigate the 
influence of intersection with respect to external validity. For example, Germany differs from 
the United States in that Germany has a parliamentary and multi-party system. Both the 
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parliamentary system and the presence of more than two parties in parliament make 
intersection more likely to occur. A recommendation for further research in this context is to 
study whether intersection loses some of its relevance in other political systems or whether it 
assumes a different shape. A useful starting point is the concept of veto points or veto players 
and how they come to a decision (e.g., Tsebelis (2002)). For instance, a similar analysis in the 
U.S. context would need to ensure that the regional or national parliamentary bodies are the 
correct group of actors to examine. The identification of the political elite should be driven by 
the question of which actors control access to the political influence that a specific social 
movement needs most.  
Another promising approach is to understand policy changes as occurring within fields 
in which social movements are one possible type of actor (Duffy, Binder and Skrentny 2010; 
Evans and Kay 2008). However, even in similar political settings, it is important to emphasize 
that the existence of an ally is a necessary condition. The Greens in Germany were a perfect 
match for the antinuclear movement in many ways, particularly because they partly emerged 
from this movement. If internal cadres characterize the organizational structure of a political 
party with no or few opportunities for outsiders to achieve high positions, it is very difficult 
for social movements to establish intersection. More generally, a political system with more 
fluctuation in parties and politicians offers more opportunities for social movements’ activists 
to obtain influential political offices. Notwithstanding these opportunities, it is important to 
emphasize that intersection might backfire both on an individual level (see the example of 
Petra Kelly) and on the organizational level (see the example of the Nuclear Freeze 
Movement). Nevertheless, the presence of an ally and the resulting potential of intersection 
are generalizable factors in explaining the success of social movements. 
Another natural question is whether the results are transferable to other social 
movements. Disregarding the important discussion of how to measure the success of other 
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movements for the sake of clarity, there is no analytical reason that intersection should be 
limited to the antinuclear movement. Intersection measures one aspect of how social 
movements connect with the political system. If we consider social movements rather than 
professional lobbying groups, then the main arguments should be transferable to other 
movements, such as the Tea Party in the United States. 
Another valuable line of research is a fine-grained analysis of intersection. More 
specific data about activists’ positions inside both networks would allow more sophisticated 
analyses. For instance, social network analyses could be used to evaluate activists’ sequence 
of formal and informal positions. This would lead to a closer look at how the micro-processes 
based on identity translate to the structural connections between networks. Such data would 
also enable researchers to observe the elite’s relations to non-elite actors in a way that makes 
it possible to disentangle the specific dynamics between actors of both groups. The data 
requirements for such procedures are high but certainly justifiable by the potential insight. 
In summary, the theoretical concept of intersection can be empirically tested and was 
provisionally confirmed in the current paper. The findings emphasize the importance of 
examining actors’ heterogeneity and their interaction to disclose micro-level mechanisms. 
Whereas ‘pure’ activists and politicians exist, activists in politics bridge these two separate 
networks. Analyses of social movements should account for the potential for such blurred 
boundaries to avoid oversimplified concepts. Further research must clarify the conditions 
under which intersection operates and the size of its influence in each case. However, the 
results of this analysis imply that intersection is important to consider. Even if it is not 
directly measureable or is difficult to quantify, intersection should be included in future 
empirical analyses.  
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 Party Careers and Electoral Success 
The Structural Effect of Political Parties on Candidates’ Success 
 
Timo Böhm 
 
 
In parliamentary elections, political parties decide candidate ranking. Because this 
ranking is highly correlated with candidates’ electoral success, political parties are central to 
understanding why some candidates have more electoral success than others. I argue that 
political parties choose candidates with party careers that signal both the ability to win 
elections and loyalty to the party’s political goals. Therefore, variations in party careers are 
connected with variations in candidates’ electoral success. I test this hypothesis by applying 
generalized linear models to an extensive dataset of candidates for the Norwegian parliament 
between 1946 and 2010, and the results support my theoretical argument. However, there is 
also evidence that party careers are less important for candidates who barely win – or barely 
lose – a seat in parliament.  
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What types of candidates win seats in parliament? In many countries, party lists have a 
strong influence on the probability that a candidate wins a seat in parliament. The higher the 
candidate’s place on the party list, the more likely he is to win the election. This correlation 
emphasizes the importance of political parties in the composition of a given parliament. How 
do political parties decide which candidates to choose from a pool of ambitious politicians? I 
argue that political parties are similar to other organizations in this respect. Seats in 
parliament can be interpreted as vacancies that a political party attempts to fill with politicians 
that support the party’s organizational goals to maximize its political influence in parliament. 
In choosing how to fill these seats, a political party looks for candidates who are both loyal to 
the party’s goals and able to deliver a strong political performance during election campaigns. 
However, both qualities are difficult to observe directly. Therefore, I argue that political 
parties use a candidate’s party career as a signal. A candidate with a long history of holding 
party offices signals loyalty. Similarly, a candidate who has held high-level positions inside 
the party structure signals the ability to deliver strong political performances. In combination 
with the strong correlation between party lists and election results, candidates with longer 
party careers and higher positions in the political party should have an increased probability 
of winning a seat in parliament. I contribute to the literature by providing a general argument 
regarding political parties’ structural influences on the success of individual candidates in 
parliamentary elections. In addition, this argument adds to the literature on the incumbency 
advantage in elections. More specifically, the argument provided in this paper implies a 
categorical difference between three different groups of candidates: incumbents, party 
officials without a previous position in parliament (who are the focus of this paper), and 
newcomers who have neither a seat in parliament to defend nor a party career that makes 
them attractive to political parties.  
 116 
I focus on Norway to conduct a robust empirical test of my theoretical arguments. The 
available data include both candidates who won and candidates who failed to win a seat in the 
national parliament. Furthermore, the data include information on 17 elections between 1945 
and 2010, which allows me to control for time-specific effects. Because there were seven 
important political parties during this period, I can also rule out differences between 
organizational recruitment procedures. For each candidate, there is information on the status 
and time period of his different party offices. Therefore, I am able to differentiate party 
officials from candidates with no party careers and derive measures for loyalty and 
performance for the first group. There is also information on candidates’ positions outside of 
political parties, such as in public administration or volunteer organizations. I use these data 
to test the main results against alternative explanations. 
Party careers and electoral success 
What types of candidates successfully win seats in parliament? In the literature, an 
acknowledged and widely tested finding suggests that an incumbent has a higher likelihood of 
keeping his seat than losing it. In other words, it is more difficult to win a seat in parliament 
than to defend it. Vacancies for new members of parliament occur when incumbents decide to 
surrender their seats. Given this general tendency, the research question should be 
reformulated: Which candidates successfully fill the vacancies that occur when incumbents 
choose not to run for office? 
In many parliamentarian elections, voters decide on ranked lists of candidates – so-
called party lists – for each party competing in the election. Even if voters have the right to 
change the order of the candidates on the list, there is evidence in the literature that voters do 
not alter the ranking significantly. This finding is true both for random (Chen et al., 2014) and 
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alphabetical lists (Webber et al., 2014), indicating that the correlation between the rank on a 
party list and electoral success is very high. Hence, a political party’s decisions regarding the 
order of politicians on its list is pivotal for a candidate’s electoral success. The higher a 
candidate appears on the party list, the higher his probability to win a seat in parliament. 
Nonetheless, the question remains: Which candidates are selected by parties and why? 
For the sake of brevity, I will not discuss the literature on why individual politicians 
decide to run for office in the first place. Some contributions in this field focus on questions 
regarding the emergence of political ambitions and the strategic choices of individual 
politicians (Black, 1972; Fox and Lawless, 2005, 2014; Maestas et al., 2006; Recchi, 1999). 
Given an existing pool of ambitious politicians, another perspective focuses on the 
organizational quality of political parties and posits that candidacies are the result of a 
recruitment process. Following a concept suggested by Hazan and Rahat (2010; Rahat and 
Hazan, 2001), recent contributions to the literature discuss political parties’ selection 
procedures in terms of whether their decision processes are centralized or decentralized and 
whether they are inclusive or exclusive (Shomer, 2014; Spies and Kaiser, 2014). This strand 
of the literature aims to determine the reasons that parties adopt certain procedures to select 
candidates. These different selection procedures can be analyzed in the next step with respect 
to the results they produce in terms of representativeness, such as results involving gender 
(Evans, 2011; Fox and Lawless, 2010). Here, researchers focus on overall outcomes. The 
contribution of this paper is to establish two main criteria for political parties’ choice of 
candidates. These criteria operate independently of different recruitment procedures and other 
more complex explanations, including the role of internal power struggles between central 
strategists and local activists (Evans, 2012). 
In choosing its candidates, a political party determines its criteria based on its 
organizational goals and therefore on an organizational perspective. As organizations 
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pursuing political agendas, political parties strive to create political influence, which largely 
depends, in turn, on electoral success. Consequently, a political party looks for candidates 
with two qualities: the ability to deliver a strong political performance during election 
campaigns and the loyalty to push to achieve the party’s goals once they are elected. A 
candidate who fulfills both characteristics can count on his party’s support. The better match a 
candidate is, the more support he should receive, and the higher his party will place him on its 
party list. 
However, both qualities are difficult to evaluate. The best option for political parties is 
to look for signals that are observable indicators of a candidate’s hidden qualities. The more 
difficult it is to fake these signals, the more reliable they are. Thus, it is natural for political 
parties to base their selection on candidates’ party careers. Party careers develop over 
extended periods of time and are easy to evaluate. More specifically, party careers are directly 
observable by party members, which means that party careers are more reliable than signals 
emerging from outside the organization’s boundaries. 
Party careers are sequences of offices inside a party’s organizational structure. Party 
officials can hold offices on different levels and for different periods of time. These two 
dimensions allow for a wide variety of combinations. Combining the two dimensions into 
sequences hints at the number of ways that party careers can vary over time. Therefore, the 
question to ask is the following: Which characteristics of party careers signal the qualities that 
a political party is looking for? The most important feature to signal a candidate’s ability to 
deliver a strong political performance is his prominence within the party. A party official with 
a national-level office has proven that he can achieve political success. Although such party 
elections are intraorganizational, they demonstrate that a politician was able to successfully 
mobilize support and convince the party electorate that he was a better choice than other 
candidates. Furthermore, higher-level offices are more difficult to win. Beginning at some 
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positional level, party officials also gain experience in handling the media, which is another 
signal for strong political performance; the most prominent examples of this feature are party 
leaders (Midtbo, 2011). Therefore, higher offices are a reliable signal of a candidate’s 
abilities. Moreover, the most important feature signaling loyalty is career length. The more 
stable a party member’s commitment is, the stronger the signal that he will stay loyal if he 
wins a seat in parliament. 
In summary, a candidate’s party career signals to his political party whether he is a 
good or bad match to pursue the organization’s goals. The stronger the signal of his ability to 
deliver a high level of performance and loyalty, the more support his political party will 
provide. The logic of the recruitment process should therefore translate into structural 
advantages that will, in turn, lead to a higher likelihood of winning a seat in parliament. The 
longer a candidate’s party career is and the higher the level of office he holds, the more likely 
it is that he will win a seat in parliament. 
With respect to the overall picture of candidates’ success in parliamentary elections, 
the argument developed here suggests three empirical expectations. First, an incumbent 
should be able to successfully defend his seat if he decides to run for office. It is important to 
re-emphasize that – although there is a connection between both processes – the mechanism 
of incumbents’ success is different from the process of candidate selection, which is the 
subject of this paper. Second, there should be a clear difference between different groups of 
candidates. Incumbents should win more often than party officials, but party officials should 
have a higher probability of winning a seat than newcomers, i.e., those candidates without a 
party career. Given the theoretical argument, political parties should always prefer candidates 
who can signal the desired qualities, even if the signal is weak. Third, the longer a candidate’s 
career and the more prominent his position in the party, the more likely it is that he should 
win a seat in parliament. 
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Data sources and preparation 
I use data provided by Norwegian Social Science Data Services (NSD) to test the 
empirical implications of the theoretical argument. The NSD covers the 1946–2010 period 
and contains information regarding candidates for the national parliament, the Storting, 
including information about candidates’ party careers and electoral records. The Storting is 
characterized by a multi-party system with shifting coalitions. Following World War II, five 
parties were the most important: the Arbeiderpartiet (Social Democrats), the Høyre 
(Conservatives), the Venstre (Social Liberals), the Kristelig Folkeparti (Christian Democrats) 
and the Senterpartiet (Center). The Social Democrats enjoyed an absolute majority between 
1945 and 1961. In 1973, two additional parties joined the Storting and became established 
participants, namely the Fremskrittspartiet (Populists) and the Sosialistisk Venstreparti 
(Socialists). The empirical analysis in this study is based on these seven political parties. Only 
one other party won seats in the Storting during the studied time period; however, this party, 
the Norges Kommunistiske Parti (Communists), have since completely disappeared. 
Therefore, I excluded Communist Party candidates from the data. Recent developments in 
Scandinavian party systems are discussed by Arter (2012). As a result, there are 5,151 
observations of 3,044 different candidates available for analysis. 
Elections for the Storting occur every four years. The number of seats are calculated 
(and allocated) according to a combination of the number of inhabitants and size of each of 19 
districts. This formula has been criticized, but it continues to be used to prevent urban areas 
from dominating parliament. Over time, the number of seats has changed incrementally: after 
World War II, there were 150 seats, which number had increased to 169 by 2010. Citizens 
vote for party lists from their districts and can change the order on these lists if desired. 
However, an analysis of the available party lists of the three Norwegian elections between 
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2001 and 2009 shows that voters rarely exercise this latter right. Positions on the party lists 
and election results are highly correlated (.92). After the elections, candidates are ranked 
based on the absolute number of votes in each district. Candidates that failed to win a seat are 
designated as successors, and these candidates are also ranked based on their respective 
number of votes. 
Party careers 
The dataset includes annual information regarding each candidate’s political party 
positions. Consequently, I combined the information on party offices into sequences. Table 1 
shows an example of the procedure I applied. All the sequences began at zero to capture the 
first transition into a party office. If there is a gap between the last party office and the 
election, the gap is filled with zeros. When there is an overlap between two offices, the 
sequence contains only the highest level. In summary, the 1,456 observations of party 
officials lead to 1,115 different patterns. If a candidate appears more than once in the dataset, 
i.e., if he runs for office in more than one election, the sequences will differ. Because they are 
nested with one another, a shorter sequence is necessarily a part of a longer sequence. 
Therefore, all the statistical models include a term to control for nesting. Although candidates 
who switch parties between elections might bias this procedure, only three candidates 
switched parties during the time period studied. Two of these three never won a seat, and the 
third candidate was not able to win again after changing parties. 
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Table 1: Example of how the sequences for each subsystem were combined. Years without an office, e.g., 
1988, are indicated with a 0. In years with two or more offices, e.g., 1990, only the highest level is part of 
the sequence. 
 
The length of party careers is calculated as the number of years since a candidate’s 
first party office, which is the length of a sequence. The candidates’ careers range from two to 
46 years, with a standard deviation of 8.5 years; 75 percent of party careers are twenty years 
or shorter. The levels include local (1), regional (2), national (3) and international (4). The 
third measure captures a possible gap between the highest party office and election. Such a 
gap could bias the results. However, approximately 76 percent of all candidates have a gap of 
four years or less, indicating that long gaps are unusual. Table 2 provides an overview of the 
descriptive statistics for the measurement of party careers. 
 
Variable Mean SD Min Max 
Party Career in Years 14.9 8.5 2 46 
Highest Level 2.4 0.8 1 4 
Years between Highest Level and Election 3.1 5.6 0 32 
     
Table 2: Descriptions of the measurements of party careers. There are 1,465 observations of 1,096 
candidates. 
Year 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Local (1) . 1 . 1 1 . . . . 
Regional (2) . . . . 1 1 1 . . 
National (3) . . . . . . . 1 1 
Sum 0 1 0 1 2 2 2 3 3 
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Table 3 shows the transition matrix between the different levels of offices, which is 
another means of obtaining a first impression of the sequences. Only candidates that were 
party officials with at least one party office at some point are considered in the calculation. As 
a result, each row shows the percentage of transitions to other levels between years. For 
instance, 8 percent of candidates who held a regional office continued to a national office 
within the next year, whereas 7 percent dropped out. The triangle below the main diagonal 
shows the percentage of transitions to higher levels, whereas the upper triangle shows the 
transitions to lower levels. The last column shows the transitions from each level of party 
offices to parliament. The data in this column are thus based on the year preceding the 
election. In other words, 65 percent of the candidates without an office held a party office at 
some point before the election and are therefore considered party officials, which is an 
additional reason to control for the time period between holding the party office and election. 
It is important to emphasize that there is no information available regarding the actual 
opportunities for party officials to obtain a higher level office. There is also no information 
regarding each office’s term. For instance, the probability of remaining at the regional level 
from one year to the next might be partly due to the term of that office. The main 
consequence of this lack of information is that it is difficult to justify operationalizations for 
more complex concepts of career patterns. Although there are ways to perform such 
calculations as a technical matter, there is no way to validate the results. Therefore, I restrict 
the analysis to the unambiguous measurements of a party career’s length and the highest level 
of a candidate’s party position. 
 
 
 
 124 
 
(0) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Seat in 
Parliament 
International (4) .02 .03 .02 .12 .81 
.38 
(3/8) 
National (3) .06 .01 .02 .91 .00 
.64 
(290/452) 
Regional (2) .07 .03 .82 .08 .00 
.52 
(157/303) 
Local (1) .10 .80 .07 .03 .00 
.47 
(79/169) 
No Office (0) .74 .12 .07 .07 .00 
.65 
(351/524) 
       
Table 3: Transition matrix of party offices. The numbers indicate the percentage of transitions that 
occurred from a row to a column. The last column indicates how many party officials managed to win a 
seat in parliament based on the position they held immediately before the election. For instance, 47 
percent of candidates that held a party office at the local level in the year before the election won a seat. 
Absolute numbers are provided in brackets. It is important to emphasize that only party officials – 
candidates who held at least one party office at some point – are included here. Therefore, the 65 percent 
of candidates without a current office but who won a seat in parliament had held a party office before the 
election and are not newcomers. 
 
Vacancies 
If there is an incumbency effect, it is important to account for undefended vacancies. 
In other words, the best opportunities for both party officials and newcomers to win a seat in 
parliament should arise when an incumbent chooses not to run again. It is therefore pivotal to 
control for the number of vacancies that were open to new candidates. I calculated the number 
of vacancies as the difference between the absolute number of seats and the number of 
incumbents running for office in the respective electoral district. As a result, I assigned 
absolute numbers of opportunities that were available for candidates in a given election period 
in their respective electoral district. On average, 43 percent, or 4 seats, were not defended by 
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incumbents, with a standard deviation of 23 percentage points, or 2 seats. Both the absolute 
numbers and the percentages were not systematically connected to regional or temporal 
developments. Although there were variations among regions and elections over time, the 
data showed no general trend. Therefore, there is no need to consider additional model 
specifications, such as interaction terms, to capture such an effect. 
Empirical analysis 
Groups of candidates 
First, I determine whether there is an overall incumbency effect. Between 1946 and 
2010, incumbents defended their seats 1,425 times. Of these 1,425 defenses, 1,366 
(approximately 96 percent) were successful. In other words, knowing that a candidate was an 
incumbent is a strong indicator of his success. Because incumbents won approximately 58 
percent of the seats during the entire period, this finding also implies that a majority of the 
Norwegian parliament’s composition is shaped by structural inertia. The argument presented 
here does not depend on why incumbents decide to leave parliament before an election. In 
addition to age, career decisions that favor positions in the private sector might be the next 
most common reason for leaving parliament (Diermeier et al., 2005; Mattozzi and Merlo, 
2008).  
Second, party officials should generally be more successful than candidates without a 
party career background. Party officials are candidates who hold at least one party office at 
some point before a respective election. Out of 3,726 observations of non-incumbents, 1,465 
(approximately 39 percent) were party officials. Approximately 60 percent of these candidates 
won a seat. Thus, party officials accounted for another 38 percent of the seats in parliament. 
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The remaining 2,270 observations represented candidates who were neither incumbents nor 
party officials when they ran for office. Out of these 2,270 observations, only 4 percent won a 
seat. These seats accounted for 4 percent of all seats in parliament during the entire period. 
Table 4 summarizes the results, and the differences are striking. Incumbents were by 
far the most successful candidates, which is consistent with recent research on the overall 
effect of incumbency on electoral success (Fridkin and Kenney, 2011; Milita et al., 2014; 
Liang, 2013). Furthermore, incumbents represented the largest group of members of 
parliament. Party officials were more likely to win a seat than to lose an election, and they 
were the second-largest group. Newcomers’ success was negligible. They lost most of the 
time, and the few candidates who won constituted a very small minority in parliament. This 
result is not surprising because political newcomers rarely enjoy political success except in 
very specific elections or when celebrities are candidates (Canon, 2010). 
 
 Success Rate Share of Seats 
Incumbents 
96 % 
(1366/1425) 
58% 
(1366/2342) 
Party Officials 
60% 
(880/1465) 
38% 
(880/2342) 
Newcomers 
4% 
(96/2270) 
4% 
(96/2342) 
   
Table 4: Descriptive results of the success rates and share of seats won by groups of candidates. The 
success rates are the proportion of candidates from each group who won a seat in parliament. The share 
of seats is the proportion of seats won by the group in relation to all seats. 
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These results show that the electoral success of incumbents and newcomers is easy to 
predict without any additional information. However, some variation must still be explained 
with respect to party officials. Sixty percent of party officials won – and 40 percent failed to 
win – a seat in parliament. According to the theoretical argument, this difference should be 
related to variations in the length of party careers and the level of candidates’ party offices. 
Statistical models 
All the models presented here are generalized linear mixed-effects models, which 
means that they include a random intercept by politicians’ ID to mitigate the possible effect of 
unobserved heterogeneity and to account for nested sequences. The models also include the 
absolute number of undefended vacancies in each electoral district. Furthermore, the models 
include electoral district, party and period dummies as control variables to account for 
possible underlying heterogeneity in these dimensions. For instance, organizational cultures 
vary among parties, which might affect their recruitment processes (Barrling, 2013), although 
estimations for these control variables are not discussed. All the results are provided as odds-
ratios (ORs). An estimated OR higher than one indicates an increased probability for the 
dependent variable. For example, an OR of two indicates that the probability of a candidate 
with that attribute to win a seat in parliament was twice as high as a candidate without the 
attribute. I calculated all the models in R (v3.1.0) using the lmer-package (v1.1-7). In 
summary, I ran three different main models, and all the models had a dummy for a successful 
election as the dependent variable. First, I tested whether there was an overall effect of 
incumbency on electoral success. Second, I tested whether differences in party careers helped 
explain party officials’ electoral success. Third, I combined both models to test whether 
observations of incumbents with party careers changed the results. All three of the models are 
summarized in Table 5. 
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Effect of incumbency. The first model is restricted to a dummy for incumbency and 
the controls discussed above. The model is a simple test of whether the descriptive pattern 
found above stays the same after controlling for the various influences of party, period, and 
electoral district. The results show that incumbents had clear advantages with respect to 
winning a seat. Both the significance and the size of the effect underscore the importance of 
incumbency. In addition, in the 59 cases of incumbents who failed to win a seat, 56 
(approximately 90 percent) missed by only one place. This finding indicates that such 
electoral results were due to idiosyncratic dynamics during election campaigns that are 
beyond the scope of this paper. Furthermore, the significant effect of vacancies on a 
candidate’s probability of winning a seat suggests that it was substantially easier to win a seat 
that was not defended by an incumbent. 
Variation in party careers. The second model focuses on party officials to directly 
compare candidates’ career patterns. Therefore, only party officials are included in this 
dataset. The model includes the highest office level of a candidate’s party career as well as the 
years since he obtained his first office and the years between the highest office level and 
election. The comparison for political offices is at the local level. Therefore, the model tests 
whether an office at a level higher than local increases the likelihood of winning a seat. 
According to the theoretical argument, I expect that a higher position and a longer party 
career positively affect a candidate’s probability of winning a seat in parliament. However, 
there are possible interactions between these effects. For instance, the length of a party career 
might only be relevant for candidates who did not hold a high-level office in the party 
hierarchy. I tested this proposition and other possible interactions between both signals by 
estimating models for subgroups of candidates according to the level of their party offices and 
by including an interaction term in the main model. The lack of significant effects and 
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significant differences among the effects justifies a focus on the interpretation of the main 
model. 
First, only offices at the national level have a positive and significant effect on a 
candidate’s probability of winning a seat in parliament. The probability of winning for 
candidates with such an office is about two times higher than those with an office at the local 
level. Furthermore, the results suggest that there is no significant difference between offices at 
the local and regional levels. The estimation for offices at the international level is less 
reliable because there are only 40 instances in the dataset, which corresponds to 3 percent of 
the observations. Second, the length of a candidate’s party career has a significant and 
positive effect on electoral success. Each additional year makes a candidate 4 percent more 
likely to win a seat in parliament. This result indicates that loyalty and commitment to 
political parties pays off for politicians. To put these findings into perspective, I calculated 
predictions for all the possible combinations of the number of vacancies, political parties, 
electoral districts and year of election while varying the length of a candidate’s political 
career and the highest level of his party position. On average, a candidate with an office at the 
national level has approximately a 68 percent likelihood of winning a seat, compared with 
only a 53 percent likelihood for a candidate with an office at the local level. A candidate with 
a five-year long career has an average probability of 50 percent of winning a seat, and each 
additional decade increases this probability by approximately 7 percent.  
 
Variable Incumbency Effect only Party Careers Complete Model 
Incumbent 85.18*** 
(63.93 – 113.50) 
 21.23*** 
(15.38 – 29.31) 
Highest Party Office 
 
  
 
Office at the Local Level  . 
. 
14.03*** 
(9.27 – 21.23) 
Office at the Regional Level  1.29 
(0.90 – 1.87) 
21.01*** 
(14.61 – 30.22) 
Office at the National Level  2.05*** 
(1.43 – 2.94) 
35.20*** 
(24.66 – 50.26) 
Office at the International Level  1.22 
(0.51 – 2.93) 
32.08*** 
(13.78 – 74.70) 
Gap between Party Office and Election  0.99 
(0.97 – 1.02) 
0.99 
(0.96 – 1.01) 
Party Career in Years  1.04*** 
(1.02 – 1.05) 
1.03*** 
(1.02 – 1.05) 
Undefended Vacancies 1.22*** 
(1.16 – 1.28) 
1.26*** 
(1.16 – 1.36) 
1.23*** 
(1.15 – 1.31) 
Controls ✓ ✓ ✓ 
BIC 4829 2176 3316 
Number of Observations 5151 1456 5151 
Number of Candidates 3044 1096 3044 
***
p < 0.001, 
**
p < 0.01, 
*
p < 0.05 
 
Table 5: All results are reported as odds-ratios with the 95 percent confidence interval in brackets. The dependent variable is a dummy for winning (1) or failing to 
win (0) a seat in the Storting. The second model only includes observations of candidates with party careers who did not win a seat in the previous election. See text 
for details and interpretation of each model. 
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In addition, a gap between the highest position and election does not make a 
difference, although this finding is potentially due to the limited variation in this variable. 
Finally, even without incumbents in this dataset, the effect of vacancies remains significant. 
This finding provides further evidence that the availability of undefended vacancies defines 
the general opportunity for a candidate to win a seat. 
Complete model. The third model combines the independent variables from the first 
two models and tests them using the complete dataset. All the effects from the previous 
models remain significant, which confirms the results described above. In addition, holding a 
party office at any level has a positive effect on the probability of winning a seat compared 
with candidates who have not held a party office. The ranking of the magnitudes of the effects 
is consistent with the theoretical argument. Offices at the national level have a stronger effect 
than offices at the regional and local levels. Again, offices at the international level are 
difficult to interpret because there are few cases in the data. The results suggest that the 
separation between incumbents and party officials is justified; in other words, the effect of 
party offices is not an artifact of the effect of incumbents and vice versa. The effect of 
vacancies remains stable. 
Alternative explanations 
Anticipation of voters’ preferences. The main argument assumed the dominance of a 
political party’s internal logic, i.e., an organization’s recruitment process. However, it is 
possible that party careers and electoral success are caused by the same factors. If that is true, 
the relation between a candidate’s party career and his electoral success is a spurious 
correlation, and the estimated effects would disappear. If the effects hold but decrease in size, 
the interpretation is that political parties mediate some of the effects of alternative factors. 
That finding would put the results into perspective but would not contradict them. If the 
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results do not change at all, the alternative explanations add something independent of the 
main effect. 
One argument in favor of a common cause is that parties choose candidates in 
anticipation of voters’ preferences and expectations. Many studies have examined how 
different attributes of candidates impact electoral success. However, a consensus seems to 
have emerged that a candidate’s quality influences election results (Buttice and Stone, 2012; 
Milita et al., 2014; Mondak, 1995). “Quality” is a term that allows for many different 
interpretations, and studies use the term quite differently. However, most specific qualities 
that are discussed in the literature can be summarized under the labels of competence and 
integrity, which were popularized by Mondak (1995). Competence can be understood as the 
sum of a candidate’s skills and abilities. Examples of competence from the recent literature 
include leadership, experience or intelligence (Fridkin and Kenney, 2011). Integrity 
represents the likelihood that a candidate will use his competence in accordance with his pre-
election promises. Examples of integrity from the recent literature include honesty or whether 
a candidate is perceived as caring (Fridkin and Kenney, 2011). This understanding can also be 
identified in formal models of valance attributes (Adams and Merrill, 2013) and models of 
more general questions regarding agency between politicians and voters (Frenkel, 2014). 
Consequently, a candidate’s quality is not only based on his party career but also on 
his record in other areas of social life. Because there is no specific information on the 
perceived quality of the candidates in the data, I use observable positions outside of political 
parties as proxies for quality. An additional advantage of this procedure is that observable 
positions are not prone to voters’ rationalization mechanisms that play an important role in 
surveys (Rahn et al., 1994). First, voters might prefer candidates with a political commitment 
outside the party system. If that is true, candidates with a position in a volunteer organization 
should be more likely to win than those without such a position. Second, voters might look 
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for a candidate’s experience in political and administrative processes. Therefore, candidates 
with public administration positions might benefit from this preference. Third, voters might 
prefer candidates with proven political abilities. This hypothesis might be connected to the 
incumbency advantage of incumbents, but it is generalized to all elected positions, such as 
political offices at the local or regional level. Although evidence from other countries has 
shown that many politicians prefer to remain at a regional level (Stolz, 2003), such a 
preference would help more ambitious politicians win a seat in the national parliament. Given 
that parties know about these preferences, they should recruit their candidates accordingly, 
creating a spurious correlation between party career and electoral success. A model using all 
these factors as independent variables is summarized in Table 6. 
The lower BIC value (3,316 vs. 3,486) indicates that the more complex model is more 
efficient than the original model; in other words, the inclusion of additional coefficients is 
justified by the increase in explained variation. The model also estimates weaker effect sizes 
for all the independent variables. However, its significance remains high, and the original 
order of effects remains the same, i.e., higher positions still have a stronger impact. A longer 
party career still increases the likelihood of winning a seat in the Storting. Although the 
alternative explanations tested do not undermine the main findings, it is notable that all three 
additional independent variables have a significant effect on electoral success. This result 
suggests that part of the effect of the alternative variables is mediated by party structure. In 
other words, parties do not exclusively recruit based on internal considerations. However, the 
results still suggest that recruitment itself significantly increases a candidate’s probability of 
winning a seat. 
Different effects for close calls. Another alternative explanation is that the significant 
effects are due to the operationalization of the dependent variable. Because there are several 
seats per electoral district, candidates can win or lose more or less clearly. In other words, it is 
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possible that the structural effect of political parties is strong for the top places on the lists but 
is less important for close calls. A possible explanation for this phenomenon is that parties 
prefer experts as candidates when a seat is contested (Galasso and Nannicini, 2011). Because 
comparatively few votes can decide which candidate wins the last seat, parties’ calculations 
change. If that is true, the effect of loyalty, i.e., the effect of longer party careers, should 
disappear. I therefore recalculated the complete model, including the variables regarding 
positions outside of political parties, using a reduced dataset. Only candidates that won the 
last seat or were only one place behind are included. Table 6 summarizes these estimations. 
The most important finding is that the effect of the length of a party career disappears. 
This result supports the argument that parties compromise on close calls. Although party 
loyalty is an important quality for recruitment, it is not relevant from a voter’s point of view. 
In addition, the effect of local and regional party offices disappears. This result suggests that 
party officials under a certain threshold are not prominent enough to translate their party 
positions into electoral success. 
Variable All Candidates Close Calls only 
Incumbent 16.13*** 
(11.68 – 22.27) 
7.85*** 
(4.66 – 13.23) 
Maximum Level   
     Office at the Local Level 2.69*** 
(1.65 – 4.39) 
1.68 
(0.73 – 3.88) 
     Office at the Regional Level 3.71*** 
(2.36 – 5.82) 
2.03 
(0.91 – 4.54) 
     Office at the National Level 6.60*** 
(4.26 – 10.23) 
3.71** 
(1.69 – 8.18) 
     Office at the International Level 7.34*** 
(2.88 – 18.69) 
. 
. 
Years between Maximum Level and Election 0.99  
(0.96 – 1.01) 
0.97 
(0.93 – 1.00) 
Party Career in Years 1.03*** 
(1.02 – 1.05) 
1.01 
(0.99 – 1.04) 
Undefended Vacancies 1.24*** 
(1.16 – 1.33) 
1.16* 
(1.03 – 1.31) 
Position in a Volunteer Organization 1.55** 
(1.20 – 2.01) 
1.85** 
(1.17 – 2.90) 
Position in Public Administration 3.04*** 
(2.08 – 4.44) 
2.07 
(0.99 – 4.33) 
Political Office at Local or Regional Level 3.58*** 
(2.48 – 5.17) 
4.68*** 
(2.15 – 10.20) 
Controls ✓ ✓ 
BIC 3316 1333 
Number of Observations 5151 1251 
Number of Candidates 3044 1028 
***
p < 0.001, 
**
p < 0.01, 
*
p < 0.05
 
 
Table 6: All results are reported as odds-ratios with 95 percent confidence intervals in brackets. Both models include variables for the alternative explanations 
described in the main text. Because there are only nine observations of candidates with an office at the international level in the second model, the standard errors were 
too high to report any meaningful estimation. See text for details and interpretation. 
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Model comparison by predictions 
The effect sizes of odds-ratios can be misleading and are particularly difficult to 
interpret in models with a variety of control variables, such as those presented in this paper. 
Therefore, I provide a comparison of the five models based on their predictive power. In other 
words, I calculated an expected result for each observation based on each model’s 
estimations. Table 7 summarizes these results. Each cell shows the percentage of correct 
predictions of winning and losing candidates. For instance, the complete model without 
alternative explanations correctly identified 89 percent of the winners and 88 percent of the 
losers, equaling a total of 89 percent of all observations. 
 Incumbency Effect Only 
Party  
Careers 
Complete 
Model 
Alternative 
Explanations 
Close 
Calls 
Won a Seat .63 .85 .89 .92 .53 
Failed to Win a 
Seat .94 .46 .88 .88 .94 
Total .80 .70 .89 .90 .85 
Observations 5151 1456 5151 5151 1251 
Candidates 3044 1096 3044 3044 1028 
      
Table 7: A summary of the correct predictions of each model and the number of observations used. See 
text for details and interpretation. 
The first model correctly predicts most candidates who failed to win a seat. However, 
only 63 percent of the winning candidates are identified correctly. The second model, which 
was restricted to party officials who had not previously held a seat in parliament, is much 
better at predicting winners. Considering party careers, 85 percent of all winners are 
predicted, whereas only 46 percent of the candidates who failed to win a seat are correctly 
identified. The complete model, which included independent variables from the previous two 
models, predicts both winning and losing candidates very well. Overall, 89 percent of all 
observations are correctly identified, with no real difference between the groups. This model 
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is slightly outperformed by the more complex model that includes the alternative 
explanations, which indicates that the additional factors also account for some part of the 
variation in electoral success. The last model, which focuses only on close calls, is similar to 
the first model with respect to its predictive power. It works well for identifying candidates 
who failed to win a seat, but it predicts only 53 percent of the winning candidates. In 
summary, the most complex model performs best insofar as predicting the correct outcome is 
concerned, but there is little difference in predictive power between that model and the model 
with no alternative explanations. 
An additional lesson can be learned from the predictions of close calls. This model is 
clearly better at identifying candidates who failed to win a seat than it is at predicting winning 
candidates. In other words, in the case of close calls, the results suggest that candidates who 
are neither incumbents nor party officials with prominent party careers will most likely fail to 
win a seat. There is more variation left with respect to explaining why some candidates are 
more likely to win. In this sense, the evidence is asymmetric, indicating that the reasons why 
some candidates win are different from the reasons why they do not lose. Therefore, structural 
factors are more likely necessary than sufficient to explain a candidate’s electoral success in 
this subgroup. A closer look at this asymmetric relation is beyond the scope of this article, but 
part of the asymmetry might be created by differences in the parties’ success rates over time, 
i.e., factors that are not influenced by differences among specific candidates or, by contrast, 
by individual campaign dynamics between candidates. 
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Conclusion 
The findings suggest that empirical variation in party officials’ electoral success can 
be traced back to political parties’ recruitment processes. Observable commitment and 
holding high-level party offices have a robust effect on a candidate’s probability of winning a 
seat in the Storting. In a comparison of all candidates, less prominent offices also impact 
electoral results. Alternative model configurations that included measures for outside 
experience and connections did not substantially change the results. However, there are 
different mechanisms at work regarding close calls. In these cases, candidates with experience 
at the local or regional level of elected offices have an advantage. Incumbency and national-
level party offices continue to have an effect, but the effect of party commitment disappears. 
This result suggests that although parties have a strong structural influence on most aspects of 
an election, voters’ preferences make a difference under specific circumstances. In summary, 
the statistical results confirm the analytical differentiation between incumbents, party 
officials, and newcomers. The evidence also shows that a candidate’s success depends on the 
number of undefended vacancies, i.e., opportunities for winning a seat without an incumbent. 
However, there are limitations to the study. First, Norway as an empirical case is 
excellent for analyzing general patterns but is less suitable for examining candidates’ electoral 
success during times of change. Although two new parties emerged during the period 
analyzed, there was no major shift in the political landscape. Second, this type of analysis 
does not allow insight into the actual process of voters’ decision-making. Whatever occurs 
inside that black box cannot be disentangled here. The same is true for feedback processes 
between incumbents and party lists (Crisp et al., 2013) and possible endogeneity between 
candidates’ ambitions, the realistic possibilities in a given electoral district and political 
parties’ recruitment processes. Nevertheless, the strong and robust relation between 
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recruitment and success across different model configurations is powerful enough for it to be 
used as a conceptual framework for further research.  
More generally, the empirical analysis presented above emphasizes the need for in-
depth information on campaign dynamics to predict electoral success on close calls. However, 
an analysis of the success of candidates is incomplete without reference to the parties’ 
recruitment logic. Although voters have the last say in elections, they face a choice that is 
strongly predetermined by the parties’ structural influence. Because elections are based on 
party lists, holding a party office and being committed to the party is at least as important to 
winning a seat as being a good choice from the voters’ perspective.  
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